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I. INTRODUCTION
Manufacturing defects, flaws or irregularities in products arising from errors
in production,1 give rise to the most basic type of products liability claim. The
misalignment of a punch press may result in a jagged burr along a product's metal
edge;2 the misadjustment of a nut on a bolt may interfere with a machine's
operation;3 and the failure to prevent foreign matter from entering food or drink
may cause its contamination.4 Tire failures frequently are the result of defective
manufacturing.5 For example, a rash of failures of Bridgestone/Firestone tires on
Ford Explorers probably resulted in part from various irregularities in the
1. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Ho Sports Inc., 232 F.3d 754, 757 (10th Cir. 2000) ("A product is
defective in manufacture if it 'deviates in some material way from its design or performance
standards. The issue is whether the product was rendered unsafe by an error in the manufacturing
process."'); Lyall v. Leslie's Poolmart, 984 F. Supp. 587, 593 (E.D. Mich. 1997) ("A manufacturing
defect claim relates to quality control; it requires proof that the product was an anomaly that failed
to conform to the manufacturer's own standards."); Wood v. Old Trapper Taxi, 952 P.2d 1375, 1379-
80 (Mont. 1997) ("Under a manufacturing defect theory, the central question is whether the product
is flawed due to improper construction.... [Manufacturing defects are] 'imperfections that inevitably
occur in a typically small percentage of products of a given design as a result of the fallibility of the
manufacturing process. A defectively manufactured product does not conform in some significant
aspect to the intended design, nor does it conform to the great majority of products manufactured in
accordance with that design."') (quoting James A. Henderson, Jr., JudicialReview ofManufacturers'
Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531, 1543 (1973))
(alteration in original); Miles v. Ford Motor Co., 922 S.W.2d 572, 585 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996), rev'd in
part on other grounds, 967 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. 1998) ("A manufacturing defect exists when a product
does not conform to the manufacturer's design standards [and] blueprints .... ).
Some state statutes provide liability for manufacturing defects, usually defining such defects in
terms of departure from intended design. See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1959) (involving a jagged burr on
car's dashboard ashtray).
3. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Gen.. Motors Corp., 446 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1971) (involving inadequately
torqued nut on bolt in suspension system that resulted in bolt falling out and loss of steering and
subsequent brake failure).
4. See, e.g., Brayman v. 99 West, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 225, 228 (D. Mass. 2000) (involving a
piece of glass in mashed potatoes); Cooper v. Borden, Inc., 709 So. 2d 878 (La. Ct. App. 1998)
(involving penicillin in milk).
5. See generally 7A AMERICAN LAW OF PRODucrs LIAniLiTY 3D § 98 (1999) (discussing tire
failure cases from various jurisdictions).
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production process.' When the manufacturing process goes awry, the resulting
products may fail to meet the manufacturer's own design specification standards.
If such a product escapes the manufacturer's quality controls, its flawed condition
may lead to its failure during use, to an accident, and possibly to an injury to the
user or another.
In general, manufacturers and other suppliers are liable for injuries caused by
manufacturing defects in products that thby sell.7 Keeler v. Richards Mfg. Co.,
Inc.,S which involved a surgical compression screw, is illustrative. The screw broke
several months after a surgeon inserted it into the plaintiff's broken hip to assist the
healing process.9 In the plaintiff's action against the manufacturer, her experts
testified that the screw had four irregularities they considered manufacturing
defects, any one of which could have caused the failure by increasing stress
concentrations that could have led to fatigue failure in the screw: (1) the screw's
internal threads were longer (1.1875 inches) than the maximum length (1.125
inches) specified in the blueprint specifications; (2) the screw contained excessive
metal debris which could have interfered with the surgeon's ability to compress the
screw properly, leading to excess movement of the bones; (3) its radius was slightly
less than the exemplar screw furnished by the manufacturer; and (4) it failed to
comply with the American Society of Testing Materials 35% ductility standard.0
The jury concluded that the screw was defectively manufactured, and the court
upheld this determination on appeal."
In former times, from ancient Rome through medieval England and into early
American law of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the incipient law of
products liability (much of which involved defective food and drink) was largely
6. While manufacturing defects appear to have been involved in many of the failures, the
accumulating evidence suggests that various design shortcomings also played a major role. See, e.g.,
SAFETY ASSURANCE OFFICE OF DEFECTS INVESTIGATION, NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
U.S. DEP'TOF TRANSP., ENGINEERING ANALYsIs REPORTAND INrIAL DECISIONREGARDING EAOO-023:
FiRESTONEWILDERNES ATTIRES 29-30 (2001) (on file with author) (suggesting design defects in the
Wilderness AT Tires); Alan B. Kruegar&Alexandrvfas, Strikes, Scabs and TreadSeparation: Labor
Strike and TheProduction ofDefectiveBridgestone/Firestone Tires (Jan. 9,2002) (unpublished paper,
Princeton Univ.) (on file with author) (finding a correlation between a labor dispute at the Decateur
Bridgestone/Firestone plant and an inordinately high proportion of manufacturing defects during the
period of the dispute).
7. On liability for manufacturing defects, see generally IDAvIDG.OWENM.STUARTMADDEN
&MARYJ. DAiS, MADDEN& O\vENONPRODUCTSLABLrrY ch. 7 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter MADDEN
& OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILrIY]; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILrrY 3D ch. 31 (1999); 2
Louis R. FRuMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 11.02 (2001) [hereinafter FRUMER
& FRIEDMAN]; RESTATEMENT (THI-RD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 2(a), 3 (1998) [hereinafter
PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT].
8. 817 F.2d 1197 (5th Cir. 1987).
9. Id. at 1199.
10. Id. at 1200-01.
11. Id. at 1201.
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comprised of cases involving physical flaws or defects.' 2 With the advent ofmodem
products liability law during the mid-1900s, 3 manufacturing defect cases for a
variety of reasons began to occupy a decreasing proportion of products liability
litigation as the plaintiffs' bar increasingly challenged the sufficiency of product
designs and warnings.14 This proportional decline in manufacturing defect cases in
part reflects improvements in the technology of production engineering, including
quality assurance. Moreover, as discussed below, the liability standards governing
manufacturing flaw cases are generally quite clear and noncontroversial-there
usually is little debate over whether a product containing a physical flaw is
"defective." Thus, manufacturing flaw cases are more likely to settle than design
and warnings defects cases which by nature involve normative judgments of safety
sufficiency. Disputes in manufacturing defect cases normally involve the
sufficiency of evidence of causation-whether the product in fact contained a
12. See, e.g., Van Bracklin v. Fonda, 12 Johns. 468 (N.Y. 1815) (involving contaminated beef);
Osgood v. Lewis, 2 H. & G. 495, 519 (Md. 1829) (involving inferior cooking oil sold as higher grade
oil); Langridge v. Levy, 2 M. & W. 519, 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (Ex. 1837), aff'd, 4 M. & W. 337, 150
Eng. Rep. 1458 (Ex. 1838) (involving a defective gun fraudulently represented as safe); Devlin v.
Smith, 89 N.Y. 470 (1882) (involving planks on painter's scaffold nailed rather than lashed down);
Schubert v. J.R. Clark, Co., 51 N.W. 1103 (Minn. 1892) (involving step ladder constructed of cross-
grained and decaying lumber); Lewis v. Terry, 43 P. 398 (Cal. 1896) (folding bed's legs failed to lock
into place). On early law generally, see 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTs LIABILITY, supra note 7,
ch. 1. The development of warranty law liability for selling defective foodstuffs is examined in I
MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 7, § 5:2; see also infra Part IV.A.
In the twentieth century, the classic products liability cases involved manufacturing defects. See,
e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., Ill N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916) (holding that an auto manufacturer
was liable in negligence for injuries caused by the collapse of car's wheel made of defective wood);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 75 (N.J. 1960) (involving a defect in car's
steering system and the breach of an implied warranty). In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,
377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963), it is unclear whether the set screws were "inadequate" because of a
defect in manufacture or design.
13. Even in the 1950s, manufacturing defects still dominated products liability litigation. See
Richard G. Wilson, Products Liability Part]: The Protection of the Injured Person, 43 CAL. L. REV.
614, 636 (1955) ("The chief concern is, of course, negligent manufacture, the insecure attachment of
a device on a machine, the introduction of a foreign substance in a loaf of bread, the use of a harmful
chemical in a cosmetic.").
14. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr., JudicialReview ofManufacturers 'Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits ofAdjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531 (1973) (arguing that courts go beyond
the limits of adjudication when they attempt to establish product safety standards in cases involving
the liability of manufacturers); Dix W. Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence ofDesign or Directionsfor
Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816 (1962) (examining the MacPherson rule that a manufacturer may
be liable for negligence to remote users of its products); George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability:
The Original Intent, 10 CARDozo L. REv. 2301 (1989) (examining the development of § 402A of
Restatement (Second) of Torts' standard of strict liability for defective and unreasonably dangerous
products); Aaron D. Twerski et al., The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability-Design
Defect Litigation Comes ofAge, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 495 (1976) (arguing that design defect cases that
require courts to set independent product safety standards by judging existing designs as defective are
within the limits of adjudication).
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manufacturing flaw attributable to the manufacturer, and, if so, whether that flaw
caused the plaintiff's harm.15 Such factual determinations are peculiarly committed
to jury determination and usually are upheld on appeal. 6
Manufacturing defect claims possess certain advantages for plaintiffs over
claims involving design and warnings defects. First, the defendant is less likely to
invest as much in defending a manufacturing defect claim since it challenges only
a single product unit rather than the entire line ofproducts. 7 In addition, and quite
unlike design and warnings cases, the liability standards for manufacturing
defects-departure from intended design 8 and product malfunction' 9 --are still
explicitly "strict."2 Moreover, manufacturing defect cases may be immune from
certain types of defenses applicable to other types of cases.2' Nor can it be doubted
that moral imperatives normally favor recovery for plaintiffs injured by physical
flaws in the products they buy and use. Manufacturers deliberately choose the level
of manufacturing flaws in their products by the level of investment they choose to
make in the quality of their production and quality control processes.' For this
reason, and because buyers reasonably expect that the products they purchase will
be free of defects, principles of fairness, truth, and restitution all demand that
manufacturers compensate persons injured by production defects.'
For these reasons, and to avoid the cost and publicity of litigation with a low
probability of success, a manufacturer persuaded that a physical flaw in one of its
products injured a claimant normally will be amenable to settling the case. But a
manufacturer is likely to litigate a case involving a physically flawed product if it
believes (1) that its product was not in fact defective;' (2) that, even if the product
was defective, the plaintiff s harm was caused by something other than the defect;'
15. On causation issues, see 1 MADDEN & OWENONPRODUCrs LIABILITY, supra note 7, § 12:1.
16. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 446 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1971) (upholding jury's
determination thatcrashwas causedby defective suspension system rather thanby driver inattention);
Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 420 P.2d 855 (Nev. 1966) (upholding jury's rejection
of bottler's theory that third-party tamperer put mouse in bottle of Squirt).
17. This difference gives rise to a rule in some jurisdictions exempting manufacturing defect
claims from the rule that prohibits evidence of subsequent improvements in design. See, e.g., Cover
v. Cohen, 461 N.E.2d 864 (N.Y. 1984) (allowing evidence of a "manufacturer's subsequent
modification to establish defectiveness" after balancing the risks of admitting such evidence).
18. See I MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCrs LIABILITY, supra note 7, § 8:3.
19. See Part III.B.
20. See I MADDEN & OWEN ONPRODUCs LIABILnTY, supra note 7, §§ 5:9, 5:10.
21. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:58C-3 (West 1987).
22. See Thomas A. Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1077,
1086-92 (1965).
23. See David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: Toward First
Principles, 68 NoTREDAMEL. REv. 427,467-68,473-74,502-03 (1993) (explaining moral bases of
manufacturer liability for manufacturing defects).
24. See cases cited infra note 43.
25. See, e.g., Calhoun v. Honda Motor Co., 738 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that plaintiff
failed to establish thatdefectivebrakes caused motorcycle accident); see also Churchv. Martin-Baker
Aircraft Co., 643 F. Supp. 499, 509 (E.D. Mo. 1986) (holding that "plaintiff's evidence failed to
2002]
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(3) that, even if the product was defective, someone or something other than the
manufacturer caused the defect after the product left the manufacturer's control;
26
or (4) that the plaintiff's damages claim is unreasonable.27
A manufacturer may breach its duty to manufacture "nondefective" products
in various ways. First, the raw materials or components used to construct the
product may contain physical flaws. For example, the materials of which the
product is comprised-such as the defective wooden spoke of the car wheel in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 8--may contain weaknesses or impurities.' 9
Similarly, the product may become contaminated during construction, as by metal
debris falling into the product's interior.3" Third, although a product's components
substantiate a causal connection" in the death of fighter pilot who ejected from plane); Crocker v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 346 So. 2d 921 (Miss. 1977) (affirmingjury verdict for defendant because fire
that destroyed plaintiff's house could just as plausibly have been started by recentrewiring of house,
or by defective installation of stove, as by defect in the stove itself); Price v. Ashby's Inc., 354 P.2d
1064, 1065 (Utah 1960) (recognizing that hole in airlift line caused one side of automobile to sink
lower than the other, but there was no proof that this defect-rather than driver error--caused the car
to continue straight at bend in road: "With two or more possible causes such as an inattentive driver
and a mechanical defect... proof that it may have been either is not proof that it was in fact either.").
26. See, e.g., Cincinnati Co. v. Ford Motor Co., No. 00CA0057, 2001 WL 227362, at *1 (Ohio
Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2001) (noting electrical short-circuit in car caused fire; summary judgment for
defendant affirmed as to manufacturing defect because plaintiff failed to show that defect existed
when car left manufacturer's control); Maher v. Gen. Motors Corp., 346 N.E.2d 833 (Mass. 1976)
(steering suddenly locking failed to establish defect at time of sale since steering had been serviced
on three occasions). For more cases along these lines, see cases cited infra note 43.
27. There is little other explanation for many of the cases, often involving defective foodstuffs,
where proof of a true manufacturing defect causing plaintiff's harm (including emotional distress) is
clear. See, e.g., Brayman v. 99 West Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 225 (D. Mass. 2000) (rejecting
excessiveness challenge with respect to verdict of$25,000, for cut in diner's throat from piece of glass
in mashed potatoes); Kroger Co. v. Beck, 375 N.E.2d 640 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that $2700
verdict is not excessive, despite absence of physical injury, for "prick" in housewife's throat from
hypodermic needle in beef).
28. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). See also Bell v. T.R. Miller Mill Co., Inc., 768 So. 2d 953 (Ala.
2000) (noting telephone pole that broke, causing accident, was made of wood containing pre-
manufacture decay and bursts).
29. Pouncey v. Ford Motor Co., 464 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1972) (finding defective steel in pickup
truck's fan blade); Rudd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1332 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (same).
30. See, e.g., Glover v. BIC Corp., 6 F.3d 1318, 1321 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that brass chips
left inside body of disposable lighter could cause it to fail to extinguish); Trowbridge v. Abrasive Co.
of Philadelphia, 190 F.2d 825, 828 (3d Cir. 1951) (involving an abrasive wheel that disintegrated due
to trapped gasses which generated internal fissures and cracks); Flagstar, Inc. v. Davis, 709 So. 2d
1132, 1134 (Ala. 1997) (involving biscuit and gravy contaminated with human blood); Williams v.
Volkswagen, 226 Cal. Rptr. 306, 308 (Ct. App. 1986) (involving foreign substance cluster in metal
near break point in steering wheel); Simpson v. Logan Motor Co., 192 A.2d 122, 123 (D.C. 1963)
(involving foreign substance in hydraulic fluid).
It is important to note that the mere presence of impurities in any amount does not automatically
render a product legally defective. "[T]he concept of defect is not self-defining when a product
contains a flaw. Since all products are flawed at some technological level, the decision must still be
made as to when a flaw emerges as a defect. In order to make this decision, some judgmental standard
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individually may be free of flaws, a mistake may be made in how they are
assembled into final form. This is the most common type of manufacturing defect
case. Thus, the ingredients in a particular batch may deviate from the specified
formulation;3 the rivets, welds, screws, or bolts used to hold components together
maybe improperly made, applied, or inserted, weakening the product's assembly;32
or the product's components may otherwise be assembled improperly.33 Fourth,
after assembly, an otherwise properly produced product may not be finished
sufficiently, leaving its edges too rough, too sharp, or otherwise hazardous.34
must be utilized." Alvin S. Weinstein et al.,ProductLiability: An Interaction ofLaw and Technology,
12 DUQ. L. Rav. 425, 430-31 (1974). "To a metallurgist all metallic structures contain flaws or
irregularities at some size level. They range from dislocations at the atomic size level to cracks visible
to the naked eye.... Since these flaws [unfortunately sometimes called defects by metallurgists] can
be identified in all products, the critical question to be asked is when can these deviations from
structural perfection really lead to a conclusion of [legal] defect." Id. at n. 11. "Materials processing
and fabrication are thus based upon flaw or irregularity control to achieve an economically feasible
trade-off among all the properties of the material which, together with proper design, serve to achieve
a given performance requirement.... [Thus], the mere presence of an identifiable irregularity or flaw
in a metallic structure is in and of itself an insufficient basis for the establishment of defect." Id. at 432
n. 1(4).
31. See, e.g., Reiter v. Zimmer, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 154,156 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (involving improper
proportion of ingredients in batch of bone cement).
32. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 446 F.2d 377, 379 (5th Cir. 1971) (involving an
improperly tightened nut on abolt that caused the suspension assembly to fail); O'Donnell v. Geneva
Metal Wheel Co., 183 F.2d 733, 736 (6th Cir. 1950) (involving a wheel barrow tire that exploded
because metal rivets holding rim together were weakened during assembly by pressing the metal too
thinwhich generated visible radial cracks); Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Wisniewski, 437 A.2d 700
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) (involving cross-threaded screw on throttle clamp that fractured); Benson
v. Tenn. Valley Elec. Coop., 868 S.W.2d 360 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (involving a defective weld in
aerial boom unit that failed in part because repair weld was too weak).
33. See, e.g., Hewitt v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 732 F.2d 1554, 1557 (1 th Cir. 1984) (involving tire
bead bundle that broke during manufacturing process); Hall v. Chrysler Corp., 526 F.2d 350 (5th
Cir.1976) (involving a misrouted transmission cable on a truck that came into contact with exhaust
manifold which melted cable and caused transmission to lock in "drive" position although gear lever
indicated "park"); Chapman v. Maytag Corp., No. IP99-0039-C-D/F, 2000 WL 1038183, at *2 (S.D.
Ind. July 27,2000) (involving pinched wire in a stove); Yamaha Motor Co. v. Thornton, 579 So. 2d
619, 622(Ala. 1991) (involving motorcycle speed reductionplate left out in manufacture); Ford Motor
Co. v. Massey, 855 S.W.2d 897, 899 (Ark. 1993) (involving stiffness of truck throttle cable which
caused vehicle to lurch into plaintiff); Simon v. Coppola, 876 P.2d 10, 14 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993)
(involving a crimp in hot tub thermostat actuator that allowed water to overheat); Home v. Liberty
Furniture Co., 452 So. 2d 204 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (involving chair parts improperly glued together);
Gasque v. Heublein, Inc., 281 S.C. 278,284,315 S.E.2d 556 (Ct. App. 1984) (involving a wire hood
that was attached improperly to stopper in bottle of sparkling wine); Willis v. Floyd Brace Co., 279
S.C. 458, 461, 309 S.E.2d 295, 297 (Ct. App. 1983) (involving a leg brace locking mechanism the
component parts of which were improperly aligned).
34. See, e.g., Stazenski v. TennantCo., 617 So. 2d 344, 345 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (involving
worker cut on sharp edge of industrial sweeper); McBumette v. Playground Equip. Corp., 130 So. 2d
117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961), rev'd in part on other grounds, 137 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1962) (involving
a child whose finger was cut off by sharp edge of swing). Compare Tibbetts v. Ford Motor Co., 358
2002]
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Finally, a properly assembled and finished product may be rendered defective
because of a dangerous flaw in how it is packaged.35
The quality control process is designed to catch such manufacturing mistakes,
but sometimes it does not. And while insufficient quality control may provide the
basis for a claim of negligence,36 a manufacturer's failure to adequately inspect or
test its products is not itself a products liability claim.37 A manufacturer's evidence
of good quality control might seem to be logically irrelevant to a strict products
liability claim, since the issue in such cases is the defectiveness of the product and
not the manufacturer's conduct in allowing the defect to arise.3' Nevertheless,
especially in cases involving allegations of foreign objects or contamination in
foodstuffs, such evidence may be admissible, even on strict liability in tort or breach
of warranty,39 if it tends to show that the manufacturer is not responsible for the
defect, to wit, that the defect (if any) probably arose after the product left the
manufacturer's control.'
N.E.2d 460, 462 (Mass. App. Ct. 1976) (holding that rough inner edges of wheel covers were not
dangerous for intended purpose).
35. See, e.g., Helm v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of St. Louis, 723 S.W.2d 465,466 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986) (exploding glass injured plaintiff after bottles fell through cardboard carton); DeWitt v.
Eveready Battery Co., 550 S.E.2d 511, 513-14 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (involving acid leaking from
battery case onto plaintiff).
36. Because quality control procedures are an important component of the production process,
employed to catch defectively manufactured products before distribution to users, evidence of
inadequate quality control may be especially relevant to negligent manufacturing claims. See, e.g.,
Jones v. United Metal Recyclers, 825 F. Supp. 1288, 1298 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (denying summary
judgment in case involving failure to inspect for defects); Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729, 731
(8th Cir. 1959) (discussing duty of manufacturer to do "reasonable inspection or tests"); see 1
MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCrS LIABILITY, supra note 7, § 2:3.
37. There is no separate claim for defective quality control. See Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
707 F. Supp. 1517,1527 (D. Minn. 1989); Valentine v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 252,
264 (Ct. App. 1999).
38. See, e.g., Nave v. Rainbo Tire Serv., Inc., 462 N.E.2d 620 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (holding
manufacturer's conduct is not a factor in strict liability cases).
39. U.C.C. § 2-314 cmt. 13 (1987).
In an action based on breach of warranty, it is of course necessary to show not
only the existence of the warranty but the fact that the warranty was broken and
that the breach of warranty was the proximate cause of the loss
sustained .... [E]vidence indicating that the seller exercised care in the
manufacture, processing or selection of the goods is relevant to the issue of
whether the warranty was in fact broken.
Id.
40. See, e.g., Brown v. Gen. Foods Corp., 573 P.2d 930, 934 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (holding
manufacturer's quality control procedures admissible on improbability thatbananapeel entered cereal
box during production); Hazelton v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 745 P.2d 309, 312 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987)
(allowing baker's evidence that it tested for metal contamination in a case involving a needle in baked
bread); Johnesee v. Stop & Shop Cos., 416 A.2d 956, 960 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) (holding
quality control evidence proper in case of possibly contaminated soup, going to improbability it was
defective).
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As mentioned earlier, issues related to causation rather than defectiveness
typically dominate cases based on claims of manufacturing defects. Especially if the
product accident destroys direct evidence of why a product accident occurred, the
crucial issue is often whether the plaintiff's proof sufficiently establishes that the
accident was attributable to a manufacturing defect as opposed to some other
plausible cause-such as normal wear and tear or the conduct of the user or
someone else. In general, a plaintiff must establish, by a reasonable probability, that
the product contained a defect attributable to the manufacturer and that such
hypothesis is more likely than any other suggested by the evidence." If a product
dangerously malfunctions, but the plaintiff is unable to prove the existence of a
specific defect, the malfunction doctrine may provide relief if the plaintiff is able
to show the probability of defect by eliminating other normal causes of such
malfunctions, as discussed below.42 Yet an allegation of a manufacturing defect
properly will be dismissed if the plaintiff fails to prove, one way or another, that the
product contained a defect that caused the harm43 and that the defect was in the
product when it left the manufacturer's control." In many manufacturing defect
cases, as in products liability litigation generally, the plaintiffmay, and often must,
establish his case by competent expert testimony. 5
41. See Triplett v. Gen. Elec. Co., 954 F. Supp. 149, 151 (W.D. Mich. 1996) ("[T]he plaintiff
must provide direct or circumstantial evidence that 'adequately supports a reasonable inference that
the accident was probably caused by a defect attributable to the manufacturer.") (quoting Holloway
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 N.W.2d 777,782 (1978)); Klinke v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 556 N.W.2d
528 (Mich. App. 1996), affd, 581 N.W.2d 272 (Mich. 1998).
42. See infra Part IH.B.
43. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Ho Sports, 232 F.3d 754 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding there was
insufficient proof that floatation vest contained a manufacturing defect); Pipitone v. Biomatrix, Inc.,
No. Civ. A. 00-1449,2001 WL 568611, at *4 (E.D. La. May 22,2001) (finding there was insufficient
proof that defendant's biological serum was contaminated); Booth v. Black & Decker, Inc., 166 F.
Supp. 2d 215,220 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (stating there was insufficient proof that manufacturing defect in
toaster caused fire that burned plaintiff's house); Prohaska v. Sofamor, S.N.C., 138 F. Supp. 2d 422,
444 (W.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding there was insufficientproofthat defendant's pedicle bone screws were
manufactured with inadequate construction materials, inadequate quality control and poor finishing
processes); Freeman v. Hoffman LaRoche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 841 (Neb. 2000) (dismissing
manufacturing defect claim where plaintiff alleged manufacturing defect but no facts to support the
allegations); Holder v. Keller Indus., No. 05-97-01168,2000 WL 141070, at*7-8 (Tex. Ct. App. Feb.
9, 2000) (holding there was insufficient proof that ladder was defectively manufactured).
44. See, e.g., York v. Am. Med. Sys., Inc., No. 97-4306, 1998 WL 863790, at *6 (6th Cir. Nov.
23,1998) (determining there was no proof thatpinpoint hole in cylinder of inflatable penile prosthesis
was caused by manufacturer).
The rule... applies only where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller's
hands, in a [defective condition].... The burden of proof [on this point] ... is
upon the injured plaintiff; and unless evidence can be produced which will
support the conclusion that it was then defective, the burden is not sustained.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (1965).
45. See, e.g., Rudd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1338 (M.D. Ala. 2001)
(alloving expert testimony after careful scrutiny); Moisenko v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengerellschaft,
100 F. Supp. 2d 489,493 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment for
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II. THEO REs OF LIABILITY
A defendant's liability for manufacturing defects may give rise to any number
of products liability claims. For example, a manufacturer may misrepresent the
purity of its products46 or a supplier of contaminated food or drink may be negligent
per se for violating a pure food statute. 7 More commonly, however, a seller of a
defectively manufactured product is subject to liability under one or more of the
three primary products liability theories of recovery-negligence, breach of implied
warranty, and strict liability in tort.
A. Negligence
In earlier times, most products liability cases for manufacturing defects were
brought in negligence. 48 A prominent case in point is MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co.,' 9 which involved the crash of an automobile due to a defective wooden spoke
in its wheel. Indeed, until the development of the doctrine of strict products liability
in tort in the 1960s, most products liability cases were manufacturing defect cases
brought in negligence. ° Because negligence is much more difficult to prove than
strict liability in manufacturing defect cases, negligence claims in such cases are
less common today than formerly. Nevertheless, negligent manufacturing (including
negligent testing and quality control) remains a viable basis of products liability
recovery in almost every state.5'
manufacturing defect claims; "it is well settled that such a claim cannot be proven without expert
testimony"). Compare Benzel v. Keller Indus., Inc., 567 N.W.2d 552 (Neb. 1997) (affirming
plaintiffs verdict on expert testimony that collapse of ladder' step was due to various defects
attributable to improper assembly and that defendant's ladders failed to meet UL standards for gaps
in steps and rails), with Hamilton v. Emerson Elec. Co., 133 F. Supp. 2d 360 (M.D. Pa. 2001)
(excluding expert testimony that miter saw brake was defective because it did not work at time of
accident, and granting defendant's motion for summaryjudgment, where expert failed to examine saw
and had no reliable basis for opinion).
46. On tortious misrepresentation, see I MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note
7, ch. 3. On breach of express warranty, see id., § 4:2.
47. See infra notes 243-45 and accompanying text.
48. One small category of cases to the contrary involved defective foodstuff claims against
retailers which most commonly asserted breach of warranty. See REED DICKERSON, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER 69-70 (1951).
49. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
50. See Wilson, supra note 13, at 636.
51. A negligence claim is logically superfluous to a claim for strict liability in tort, since the
former requires proof of all elements of the latter plus fault See, e.g., Guilbeault v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 84 F. Supp. 2d 263,280 (D. R.I. 2000) ("[I]t is unclear to this courtwhy plaintiffwould
include a negligent manufacturing claim in their Complaint since strict liability will lie due to a
manufacturing defect without ... the additional requirement that defendant knew or should have
known of the defect."). In addition, a few states by statute have merged negligence, warranty, and
strict liability claims into a single "product liability" claim. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-
572m(b), 52-572n (1958) (providing for single product liability claim); IND. CODEANN. § 34-6-2-115
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Negligence, it will be recalled, 2 is unreasonable conduct, as measured against
the conduct of a reasonable prudent manufacturer in the same or similar
circumstances. 3 Ordinarily, reasonable care is ascertained according to a calculus
of risk, balancing the burden or costs of improving safety against the foreseeable
safety benefits of so doing. If the foreseeable risks from an occasional flaw are
simply that a person may suffer a scratch or snag an article of clothing, then
minimal quality control generally is sufficient.5 4 Yet, if the foreseeable risks from
a manufacturing flaw are substantial, as with defects in the steering or braking
mechanisms of a car, then due care requires a manufacturer to devote considerable
resources to preventing such errors during production and to catching resulting
flaws thereafter through an effective system for quality control.5
Because of the difficulties in proving the specific manufacturing mistake that
caused a production flaw in an accident product, together with the likelihood that
any such mistake was the result of the manufacturer's negligence, courts commonly
allow juries to infer negligence from proof of a manufacturing flaw alone.5,6
B. Strict Liability
Even if manufacturers exercise due care, however, they generally are strictly
liable-in warranty and in tort-for injuries caused by production defects in
(Michie 1998) (same); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2800.52 (West 1997) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:58C-1(b)(3) (West 1987) (same); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.010(4) (West 1992) (same).
52. Negligence claims are addressed generally in 1 MADDEN& OWEN ON PRODUCrS LIABILITY,
supra note 7, ch. 2. For negligent manufacturing claims, see 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUcTS
LIABILITY, supra note 7, § 7:2.
53. Holder v. Keller Indus., No. 05-97-01168-CV, 2000 WL 141070, at *6 (rex. Ct. App. Feb.
9, 2000) (explaining that defendant ladder manufacturer's conduct must be measured against
"standard of a reasonably prudent manufacturer of ladders rather than an ordinary prudent person").
54. This was the defendant's argument made and rejected inFordMotor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d
729, 731-34 (8th Cir. 1959).
55. "The obligation to inspect must vary with the nature of the thing to be inspected. The more
probable the danger the greater the need of caution." MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050,
1055 (N.Y. 1916) (Cardozo, J.).
A garment maker is not required to subject the finished garment to anything like
so minute an inspection for the purpose of discovering whether a basting needle
has not been left in a seam as is required of the maker of an automobile or of
high speed machinery or of electrical devices, in which the slightest inaccuracy
may involve danger of death.
See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 395 cmt. e (1965).
56. See, e.g., Pouncey v. Ford Motor Co., 464 F.2d 957, 961 (5th Cir. 1972) (involving an
automobile fan blade made of dirty steel); Jenkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 446 F.2d 377, 379 (5th Cir.
1971) (involving improper tightening of nut on bolt in rear suspension system); Klinke v. Mitsubishi
Motors Corp., 556 N.W.2d 528, 532 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996), aff'd, 581 N.W.2d 272 (Mich. 1998)
(involving a car's steering knuckle that fractured); see 1 MADDEN & OWENONPRODUCrS LIABILITY,
supra note 7, § 2:3.
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products that they make and sell.17 The very essence of an ordinary exchange
transaction involving a new product is the notion that the buyer is paying
appropriate value for a certain type of "good" comprised of various utility and
safety characteristics common to each unit of that type produced by the maker
according to a single design. Both the manufacturer and the buyer contemplate (and
hence contract for) an exchange of a standard, uniform monetary value for a
standard, uniform package of utility and safety. At some level of abstract awareness
most consumers know, of course, that manufacturers sometimes make mistakes and
that the cost of perfect production for many types of products would be exorbitant.
Yet, while consumers may abstractly comprehend the practical necessity of
allowing imperfect production, their actual expectation when purchasing a new
product is that its important attributes, including safety, will match those of other
similar units."8 When a purchaser pays full value for a product that appears to be the
same as every other, only to receive a product with a dangerous hidden flaw, the
product's price and appearance both generate false expectations of safety in the
buyer. Buyers do not intend to pay fair value for a mismanufactured product only
to be maimed or killed. 9 Nor, in the modem world, can a manufacturer reasonably
expect to be relieved of responsibility for such harm from hidden production
defects.60 Thus, the expectations of the parties, buttressed by principles of fairness
and restitution, support the maker's strict responsibility for harm from latent
manufacturing defects. 6' For all of these reasons, courts and legislatures widely
provide that strict liability is the appropriate standard of liability for injuries
resulting from manufacturing defects. 62
57. Similarly, retailers and other suppliers downstream from the manufacturer ordinarily are also
strictly liable for harm from manufacturing defects in products they supply. See PRODUCTS LIABILnY
RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § I cmt. e, § 2 cmt c.
58. See, e.g., Dico Tire, Inc. v. Cisneros, 953 S.W.2d 776,783 (Tex. App. 1997) (affirming jury
verdict for plaintiff in case involving a defective bead bundle and an exploding tire during repair)
("The manufacturing defect theory is based upon a consumer expectancy that a mass-produced
product will not differ from its counterparts in a manner which makes it more dangerous than the
others.").
59. In the leading English case explaining this notion of implied warranty, Lord Ellenborough
colorfully explained the concept: "[T]he intention of both parties must be taken to be, that [the
product] shall be saleable in the market under the denomination mentioned in the contract between
them. The purchaser cannot be supposed to buy goods to lay them on a dunghill." Gardiner v. Gray,
171 Eng. Rep. 46,47 (K.B. 1815).
60. If the defect is obvious, rather than hidden, there is no untruth within the transaction to
generate false safety expectations in the consumer nor, hence, to support the manufacturer's
responsibility for resulting harm.
61. For a discussion of the policies underlying strict liability for manufacturing defects, see
PRODUCrS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 2 cmt. a. For a discussion of the ethical bases for
strict liability in this context, see Owen, supra note 23, at 468-77.
62. By defining liability for manufacturing defects in terms of departure from design
specifications, both courts and legislatures are employing a basis of liability that is truly strict. See
infra Part III.A.
[Vol. 53: 851
MANUFACTURING DEFECTS
1. Warranty
The earliest approach the modem law employed to enforce these expectations,
which has now been in effect for about two centuries,6 3 was to imply into the
exchange transaction a promise or warranty by the seller of the basic, uniform
soundness-safety, in this context-of its goods. Today, the implied warranty of
merchantability provides buyers a general guarantee, enforceable under the Uniform
Commercial Code, against manufacturing defects inthe goods they buy." Similarly,
the sale of a defectively manufactured product may breach an express warranty 5
or the implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose.6 6 While strict liability in
tort in most states normally may be a preferable theory of recovery for personal
injury damages, the implied warranty of merchantability offers a strict basis of
liability for personal injuries in the few states that have not adopted the doctrine of
strict liability in tort;67 it provides a basis for economic losses in the many states that
preclude recovery of such damages in tort;6' and it offers a miscellany of other
advantages in various situations.69
2. Strict Liability in Tort
The doctrine of strict liability in tort, which evolved out of warranty cases
involving manufacturing defects,7" is particularly well-suited to claims for injuries
causedby manufacturing defects.7' Amajority ofthe earliest cases adopting § 402A
63. It has been in effect longer in England than in most states in this nation. See William L.
Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV. 117, 118-22 (1943).
64. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1987);see 1 MADDEN&OwENONPRODUCrsLIABILrr, supra note 7, § 4:5.
65. Id. See Spectron Dev. Lab. v. Am. Hollow Boring Co., 936 P.2d 852 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).
66. U.C.C. § 2-315 (1987);see 1 MADDEN& OwENoNPRoDUCTSLIABILITY, supra note 7, § 4:8.
67. The states are Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, and Virginia. See, e.g.,
DeWitt v. Eveready Battery Co., 550 S.E.2d 511 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (bringing action under the
implied warranty of merchantability for a battery that leaked acid); Triplett v. Gen. Elec. Co., 954 F.
Supp. 149 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (involving defective ballast in flourescent light that caused fire;
common law implied warranty).
68. See, e.g., Spectron Dev. Lab., 936 P.2d 852 (involving economic losses and damage to
defectively manufactured light-gas gun that exploded, and to owner's other property; implied and
express warranty claims allowed, but negligence and strict liability in tort claims denied).
69. One advantage is the four-year statute of limitations (from the date of sale) under U.C.C. § 2-
725 (1987), compared to the'two- or three-year statute of limitations normally provided in tort. Some
courts and juries maybe more likely to find that a product malfunction alone establishes that a product
was not "fit" for its ordinary purposes, under U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c)(b) (1987), than that the product
was "defective" for purposes of strict liability in tort. See, e.g., Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 42 F.3d
106, 110 (2d Cir. 1994) (upholding jury finding that SUV which rolled over was not defective but was
unfit for its ordinary purpose); see infra Part H.B.
70. See 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTs LIABILITY, supra note 7, § 5:2.
71. "Commentators and courts agree that the manufacturing defect case presents the clearest and
strongest case for applying both strict liability in tort and the consumer expectations test." Rebecca
Korzec, Dashing Consumer Hopes: Strict Products Liability and the Demise of the Consumer
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of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in the mid-1960s involved manufacturing
defects,72 and strict liability in tort remains the preferred basis of recovery in
manufacturing defect cases generally73 and under § 2(a) of the Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Products Liability (Products Liability Restatement) in particular.74
Whether a product is in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" under
§ 402A, according to the Reporter's comments, depends upon whether it is
dangerous beyond the safety expectations of ordinary consumers.75 For this reason,
and because the protection of reasonable consumer expectations is a basic rationale
for imposing strict liability on sellers of defectively manufactured products, many
of the earlier decisions involving manufacturing defects explained liability in terms
of protecting consumer expectations.76 Some decisions have not only explained but
purported also to apply consumer expectations as a test of liability,77 often with little
success because of the vagueness inherent in the test.7 Many other courts,
Expectations Test, 20 B.C. & INT'L COMP. L. REv. 227, 243 n.120 (1997). See also William E.
Westerbeke, The Sources of Controversy in the NewRestatement ofProducts Liability: StrictLiability
Versus Products Liability, 8 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 1-2 (1998) (analyzing the development of
products liability law in relation to the Restatements); 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY,
supra note 7, § 5:11. This point has long been acknowledged. See David A. Fischer, Products
Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv. 339 (1974).
72. Of the first eight cases adopting § 402A, all in 1965 and 1966, six appeared to involve
manufacturing defect claims. See 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 7, § 5:3,
at 273-74 nn.59-66.
73. See Riley v. De'Longhi Corp., No. 99-2305, 2000 WL 1690183 (4th Cir. Oct. 30, 2000);
Indep. Sch. Dist. 441 v. Bunn-O-Matic Corp., No. CO-96-594, 1996 WL 689768 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec.
3, 1996).
74. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmts. g, i (1965); see generally Hamilton v.
Emerson Elect. Co., 133 F. Supp. 2d 360 (M.D. Pa. 2001); Myrlak v. Port Auth., 723 A.2d 45 (N.J.
1999) (quoting § 2(a) but decided under similar provision of products liability statute); Spectron Dev.
Lab. v. Am. Hollow Boring Co., 936 P.2d 852 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997); see generally PRODUCrs
LIABILITYRESTATEMENT,supra note 7, § I cmt. a, § 2 cmt. a. Today, many manufacturing defect cases
are decided under the malfunction doctrine, as set forth in the Products Liability Restatement § 3. See
infra Part III.B.
75. See 1 MADDEN& OWENONPRODUCTSLIABILITY, supra note 7, §§ 5:6,8:3; Linda A. Sharp,
Annotation, Products Liability: Consumer Expectations Test, 73 A.L.R. 5th 75 (1999) (explaining
that many jurisdictions have adopted the consumer expectations test).
76. See Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140, 1144-45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Phipps v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 958 (Md. 1976); State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113,
120 (Miss. 1966); Ford Motor Co. v. Darryl, 432 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
77. See Chapman v. Maytag Corp., No. IP99-0039-C-PIF, 2000 WL 1038183, at *3 (S.D. Ind.
July 27,2000); Boy v. I.T.T. Grinnell Corp., 724 P.2d 612, 620 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) ("If something
goes wrong in the manufacturing process, the result is a product which the manufacturer did not intend
and which could hardly be contemplated by the consumer."); see also Indep. Sch. Dist. 441 v. Bunn-
O-Matic Corp., No. CO-96-594, 1996 WL 689768, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1996) (explaining
that the consumer expectation instruction is appropriate for manufacturing defect case).
78. See Chapman, 2000 WL 1038183, at *3; Bhagvandoss v. Beiersdorf, Inc., 723 S.W.2d 392,
395-96 (Mo. 1987), affg No. WD36461, 1986 WL 141628, at *5 (Mo. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 1986);
Fitzgerald Marine Sales v. LeUnes, 659 S.W.2d 917,919 (Tex. App. 1983); Controlled Atmosphere,
Inc. v. Branom Instrument Co., 748 P.2d 686 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988). On the vagueness of the
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apparently understanding that rationales for liability theories frequently serve
poorly as liability tests, have tended to shy away from applying the consumer
expectations standard as a formal test for establishing liability in manufacturing
defect cases.79 Recognizing that the risk-utility test is entirely inappropriate in a
context which properly requires a strict liability standard,"° most courts in the 1980s
and early 1990s simply left the term manufacturing defect undefined without a
liability "test" of its own.
Spurred in the 1990s by the liability definitions for manufacturing defects in the
Products Liability Restatement, courts in recent years have increasingly based
liability for manufacturing defects in two quite different ways. As a specific
definition of manufacturing defect, recent decisions have turned to the Products
Liability Restatement's "departure from intended design."3' And in cases involving
product malfunctions under circumstances suggesting product defect, many courts
have been applying the "malfunction doctrine," a principle of circumstantial
evidence allowing recovery on evidence of this type. 2 These two bases of strict
liability, examined in the following two sections, are now the principal liability tests
for manufacturing defects.
H. MANUFACTURING DEFECT TESTS
For many years, both courts and commentators considered the meaning of the
"manufacturing defect" concept so self-evident as to be self-defining. A defect in
manufacture simply meant that through some mistake in the production process the
product was rendered "defective." 3 Thus, until quite recently, judicial decisions
involving this form of defect generally failed to provide a definitional "test" of
consumer expectations test, see 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCrs LIABILITY, supra note 7, § 5:6.
79. See, e.g., Dico Tire, Inc. v. Cisneros, 953 S.W.2d 776,783 (Tex. App. 1997) (reasoning that
"[d]esign defect cases are not based on consumer expectancy").
However, if the relevant state's statute defines defectiveness in consumer expectation terms, a
court is bound to use that standard in manufacturing defect as other cases. See, e.g., Chapman, 2000
WL 1038183, at *4 (applying an Indiana statute to case involving a wire pinched between parts of
stove during assembly).
80. "The risk-utility analysis applies to design defects cases, not manufacturing defect cases."
Leverette v. Louisville Ladder Co., 183 F.3d 339, 342 (5th Cir. 1999). For a rare exception to this
nearly universal principle of strict products liability, see Controlled Atmosphere, Inc. v. Branom
Instrument Co., 748 P.2d 686 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
8 1. See PRODUCTS LiABLrry RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 2(a).
82. See id. § 3.
83. See John NV. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 14 (1965) ("[A]
defective condition is easily understandable in the usual situation in which a particular article has
something wrong vth it. Because of a mistake in the manufacturing process, for example, theproduct
was adulterated or one of its parts was broken or weakened or not properly attached .... "); Richard
G. Wilson, Part II: The Protection of the ProducingEnterprisingProducts Liability, 43 CAL. L. REv.
809, 810 (1955).
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liability for such defects. 4 If a plaintiff establishes a manufacturing defect from a
commonsense perspective, and further proves that the manufacturer was responsible
for the defect and that the defect injured the plaintiff, most defendants have no
reason to contest the plaintiffs conception of manufacturing "defectiveness" such
that, even today, most courts simply do not bother to define the term.'-
A. Departure from Design Specifications
1. Development of the Departure-from-Design Test
During the 1960s, although little attention was devoted to the issue, products
liability scholars began to develop a formulation of the manufacturing defect
concept that evolved in pragmatic terms into a departure from the manufacturer's
intended design standards, a deviation from the maker's "blueprint" specifications. 6
Manufacturing defectiveness was defined in this logical manner in a prominent law
review article published by Professor James Henderson in 1973,7 and over the next
couple of decades a scattering of courts picked up and repeated variations of this
84. See Hewitt v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 732 F.2d 1554 (11 th Cir. 1984) (involving a tire bead
bundle that broke during manufacturing process); Hall v. Chrysler Corp., 526 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1976)
(involving a misrouted transmission cable on truck).
85. See Bell v. T.R. Miller Mill Co. Inc., 768 So. 2d 953 (Ala. 2000) (involving a telephone pole
made of rotten wood); Sanders v. Hartville Milling Co., 14 S.W.3d 188, 200 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000)
(involving toxins in animal feed).
86. See Page Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a
Defect, 41 TEX. L. REV. 855, 859 (1963) ("a miscarriage in the manufacturing process" that made the
product different from what "it was intended to be"); Ralph Nader & Joseph A. Page, Automobile
Design and the Judicial Process, 55 CAL. L. REv. 645, 649 (1967); Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and
Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 367 (1965). Traynor
noted:
A defective product may be defined as one that fails to match the average quality
of like products, and the manufacturer is then liable for injuries resulting from
deviations from the norm.... If a normal sample of defendant's product would
nothaveinjured plaintiff, butthe peculiarities oftheparticular product did cause
harm, the manufacturer is liable for injuries caused by this deviation.
Id.
On the departure-from-design-specification standard for defining manufacturing defects, see
generally 2 AMERICANLAW OFPRODUCTS LIABILITY 3D § 31:3 (1999); 2 FRUMER&FRIEDMAN, SUpra
note 7, § 11.02[3][a]; 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 7, § 7:1; PRODUCTS
LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 2(a).
87. Henderson, supra note 1, at 1543.
Manufacturing flaws are imperfections that inevitably occur in a typically small
percentage of products of a given design as a result of the fallibility of the
manufacturing process. A flawed product does not conform in some significant
aspect to the intended design, nor does it conform to the great majority of
products manufactured in accordance with that design.
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formulation," a number of them relying for authority on Professor Henderson's
article."
From the first draft of the first sections of the Products Liability Restatement
in 199 3 ,9' manufacturing defect was defined in terms of "a departure from the
product's intended design," and § 2 of the Restatement as eventually published in
1998 provides: "A product: (a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product
departs from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the
preparation and marketing of the product ... ."9 Since the American Law
Institute's adoption of the departure-from-intended-design.definition in the early
1990s, an increasing number of courts have used some form of this standard for
defining manufacturing defectiveness, 92 some relying expressly on § 2(a) of the
88. The cases almost all involved design defects where the definition of manufacturing defects
was dictum. See, e.g., Singleton v. Int'l Harvester Co., 685 F.2d 112, 115 (4th Cir. 1981) ("In
manufacturing defect cases, the plaintiff proves that the product is defective by simply showing that
it does not conform to the manufacturer's specifications."); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d
871, 881 (Alaska 1979) ("Under the 'deviation from the norm' test, the product is classified as
defective because it does notmatch the quality ofmost similar products."); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Inc.,
573 P.2d 443,454 (Cal. 1978) ("[A] manufacturing orproduction defectis readilyidentifiable because
a defective product is one that differs from the manufacturer's intended result or from other ostensibly
identical units ofthe sameproduct line."); Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240, 1247 (Colo.
1987) (noting "whether the product as produced conformed with the manufacturer's specifications");
Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 970 (Mass. 1978) ("[T]he jury might simply compare the
propensities of the product as sold with those which the product's designer intended it to have and
thereby reach a judgment as to whether the deviation from the design rendered the product
unreasonably dangerous and therefore unfit for its ordinary purposes."); Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365
N.W.2d 176, 182 (Mich. 1984) ("[In manufacturing defect cases], the product may be evaluated
against the manufacturer's own production standards, as manifested by that manufacturer's other like
products."); Duke v. Gulf&W. Mfg. Co., 660 S.W.2d 404,411 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) ("[T]hejury can
rather easily determine whether a single product conforms to the intended design."); Ford Motor Co.
v. Pool, 688 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Tex. App. 1985) ("Manufacturing defect cases involve products which
are flawed, i.e., which do not conform to the manufacturer's own specifications, and are not identical
to their mass-produced siblings."), rev'd in part on other grounds, 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1986).
89. See, e.g., Rix v. Gen. Motors Corp., 723 P.2d 195, 200 (Mont. 1986); Thibault v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 846 (N.H. 1978); Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 417 N.E.2d 545, 552
(N.Y. 1981) (dissenting opinion citing to article).
90. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 101(2)(a) (Prelim. Draft No. 1, 1993).
Professors Jim Henderson and Aaron Twerski were co-Reporters for this Restatement.
91. PRODUcTs LiABILrrY RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 2(a).
92. See, e.g., Perez-Trujillo v. Volvo Car Corp., 137 F.3d 50, 53 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that
a manufacturing defect exists "if the product 'differs from manufacturer's intended result or from
other ostensibly identical units of the same product line"') (quoting Santana v. Superior Packaging,
Inc., No. RE-89-593, 1992 WL 754830, at *5 n.7 (P.R. Dec. 12, 1992); McKenzie v. S K Hand Tool
Corp., 650 N.E.2d 612, 616 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (holding that a manufacturing defect was established
"because the measurements of the parts of the wrench were shown not to comply with the
manufacturer's specifications."); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 772 So. 2d 339, 344 (La. CL
App. 2000) (finding a defect if "product deviated in a material way from the manufacturer's
specifications or performance standards for the product or from otherwise identical products
manufactured by the same manufacturer.") (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:280055 (2001)); Wood
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Restatement.93 In addition, beginning with Washington in 1981,9' several states
have enacted statutes defining manufacturing defects by some formulation of the
departure-from-design theme.9" Mississippi's statute is the most concise, providing
for liability if a product was "defective because it deviated in a material way from
the manufacturer's specifications or from otherwise identical units manufactured
to the same manufacturing specifications. 96 Under such a statute, at least one court
has allowed the plaintiff to establish a manufacturing defect by circumstantial
evidence that the product malfunctioned under circumstances suggesting that a
defect in manufacture caused the malfunction.97 On some basis or another, however,
the plaintiffin a manufacturing defect case must prove the existence of a defect, that
the product contained the defect at the time it left the defendant's control,98 and that
the defect caused the plaintiff s harm. 99 As mentioned earlier, many courts require
v. Old Trapper Taxi, 952 P.2d 1375, 1380 (Mont. 1997) (defining manufacturing defect as a
"manufactured product [that] does not conform in some significant aspect to the intended design, nor
does it conform to the majority of products manufactured in accordance with that design."); Miles v.
Ford Motor Co., 922 S.W.2d 572, 585 (Tex. App. 1996), rev'd inpart on other grounds, 967 S.W.2d
377 (Tex. 1998) (finding manufacturing defect if accident product "does not conform to the
manufacturer's design standards [or] blueprints"); Mortonlnt'l v. Gillespie, 39 S.W.3d 651,656 (Tex.
App. 2001) (holding that "a plaintiff has a manufacturing defect claim when a finished product
deviates, in terms of its construction or quality, from the specifications orplanned output inamanner
that renders it unreasonably dangerous"); Dico Tire, Inc., v. Cisneros, 953 S.W.2d 776, 783 (Tex.
App. 1997) (holding that a manufacturing defect exists "when a product does not conform to the
design standards and blueprints of the manufacturer and the flaw makes the product more dangerous
and therefore unfit for its intended or foreseeable uses").
93. See Hamilton v. Emerson Elec. Co., 133 F. Supp. 2d 360, 365 (M.D. Pa. 2001); Warren v.
K-Mart Corp., 765 So. 2d 235, 237-38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Myrlak v. Port Auth., 723 A.2d 45,
51 (N.J. 1999); Spectron Dev. Lab. v. Am. Hollow Boring Co., 936 P.2d 852, 856 (N.M. Ct. App.
1997); Parker v. St. Vincent Hosp., 919 P.2d 1104, 1108 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996).
94. WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.030(2)(a) (West 1992) provides: "A product is not
reasonably safe in construction if, when the product left the control of the manufacturer, the product
deviated in some material way from the design specifications or performance standards of the
manufacturer, or deviated in some material way from otherwise identical units of the same product
line."
95. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.55 (West 1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-2 (West
2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.74 (West 2001).
96. MiSS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(a)(i)(1) (1972).
97. See Jurls v. Ford Motor Co., 752 So. 2d 260, 265-66 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (explaining in a
3-2 decision that even under deviation-from-specifications statutory definition, product malfunction
entitled plaintiff to jury consideration of manufacturing defect on basis of res ipsa loquitur).
98. See, e.g., Hamilton, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 377-78 (granting summary judgment for
manufacturer because plaintiff failed to prove that defect in miter saw's braking device was present
when saw left manufacturer). Cf. Wood v. Old Trapper Taxi, 952 P.2d 1375, 1380-81 (Mont. 1997)
(involving collapse of radio tower manufactured three decades earlier; evidence that manufacturing
defect in tower was present before it left manufacturer, though weak, was sufficient).
99. Dico Tire, Inc. v. Cisneros, 953 S.W.2d 776, 783 (Tex. App. 1997) ("To recover for a
manufacturing defect, the plaintiff must show a manufacturing flaw which renders the product
unreasonably dangerous, that the defect existed at the time the product left the seller, and that the
defect was the producing cause of the plaintiff's injuries."). Accord, Wood, 952 P.2d at 1379
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such proof by expert testimony."'
One of the few reported decisions explicitly applying a deviation-from-design-
specifications standard is McKenzie v. SKHand Tool Corp.' While using a three-
quarter inch ratchet wrench, the parts of which were held together by a snap ring,
the plaintiff was injured when the wrench came apart causing him to fall upon the
floor. 2 In an action against the wrench manufacturer, the plaintiff's expert
theorized that the snap ring failed because of defective manufacture in both (1) the
hardness of the snap ring, and (2) the diameter of the wrench handle groove in
which the ring was seated.1 3 The manufacturer's blueprints contained specifications
for the sizes of each component of the wrench together with specific tolerances
(upper and lower limits) for each measurement.' 4 Each particular wrench was
considered acceptable if its particular measurements fit within the tolerance limits,
and if any measurement fell outside the upper or lower limits, the machinist knew
that the part was unacceptable.' s As for the ring's hardness, the specifications
called for a measurement of 48-52 on the Rockwell C scale, whereas the accident-
wrench ring measurements ranged (in various places) from 45-51. As for the
diameter of the handle groove, the specifications called for 2.290 inches, with a
tolerance of .005 inches, providing an acceptable range of 2.285-2.295 inches.
However, the diameter of the groove on the accident wrench measured appreciably
larger, between 2.3125-2.3130 inches.106 Concluding that the evidence was relevant
to defectiveness and causation, and that the trial court's exclusion of it therefore
was erroneous, the McKenzie court ruled that the plaintiff had established a prima
facie case of manufacturing defectiveness. 7
(explaining that "[t]he defect [must be] traceable to the defendant").
On the requirement of causation, see, for example, Stewart v. Von Solbrig Hosp., Inc., 321
N.E.2d 428,432 (111. App. Ct. 1974), which involved a defective stainless steel surgical pin implanted
in plaintiff's leg. The pin was not designed to withstand weight of person and when plaintiff walked
on leg contrary to doctor's orders, the pin broke. Id. at 430. The court found that the pin would have
broken even if it had not contained manufacturing defects which reduced its strength by one-third. Id.
at 432. See also Lucas v. Texas Indus., 696 S.W.2d 372, 378 (Tex. 1985) (involving a concrete beam
which was manufactured with one-inch inserts rather than the one and one-quarter inch inserts
specified in plans and which fell on plaintiff while being lifted with one and one-quarter inch lifting
equipment; no evidence that beam's failure to be manufactured to specifications caused the danger
or, by implication, the harm). On causation generally, see 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS
LiABErr, supra note 7, §§ 12:1, 13:1.
100. See, e.g., Moisenko v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschatt, 100 F. Supp. 2d 489, 493
(W.D. Mich. 2000) (requiring proof of manufacturing defect by expert testimony); see also Pipitone
v. Biomatrix, Inc., No. Civ. A. 00-1449,2001 WL 568611 (E.D. La. May 22, 2001) (same).
101. 650 N.E.2d 612 (111. App. Ct. 1995).
102. Id. at 614.
103. Id. at 615-16.
104. Id. at 614-15.
105. Id. at 615.
106. Id. at 617.
107. McKenzie, 650 N.E.2d at 619.
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There are many slight variations in how courts and legislatures define the
deviation-from-specification liability standard, although all mean essentially the
same thing.' 5 A possible benefit ofthe Products Liability Restatement formulation
in departure-from-intended-design terms is that it provides a sound basis upon
which the liability test's formulation may begin to standardize." 9 Any such
standard of course must allow for tolerances within which a product may be
considered nondefective, as the tolerances mentioned above in McKenzie illustrate,
since absolute perfection is not possible (because of limitations of science and
technology), nor desirable (because of cost), nor necessary (for accident
prevention). A straight-forward departure-from-design-standard definition
occasionally may fail to capture a product hazard that properly shouldbe considered
a manufacturing defect, such that the normal definition from time to time may need
to be supplemented in some respect. And most courts will certainly want to allow
manufacturing defects to be established by the malfunction doctrine"' and possibly
by other forms of proof."' But courts should have little difficulty handling such
special situations as they arise, and, for the bulk of manufacturing defect cases, it
may safely be predicted that courts increasingly will define manufacturing defect
in terms of departure from design specifications.
2. Methods of Proof; Ethical Implications
The statutes and several judicial decisions mentioned above explicitly provide
a two-pronged definition of manufacturing defect which allows a plaintiff to
establish defectiveness by either of two alternative methods of proof: comparing
the accident-product unit to the manufacturer's formal design specifications or to
the dimensions and other parameters of some otherwise identical product. The result
of either form of proof should be essentially the same, of course, for the two
approaches provide alternative routes to the same destination-a determination of
108. Definitions vary over time even in the same jurisdiction. Compare Morton Int'l v. Gillespie,
39 S.W.3d 651,656 (Tex. App. 2001) ("[A] plaintiff has a manufacturing defect claim when a finished
product deviates, in terms of its construction or quality, from the specifications or planned output in
a manner that renders it unreasonably dangerous."), with Dico Tire, Inc. v. Cisneros, 953 S.W.2d 776,
783 (Tex. App. 1997) ("A manufacturing defect exists when a product does not conform to the design
standards and blueprints of the manufacturer and the flaw makes the product more dangerous and
therefore unfit for its intended or foreseeable uses.").
109. The adoption of the standard by a number of courts suggests that this process has begun.
See supra note 1. However, it should be noted that the Products Liability Restatement itself appears
unconcerned with uniformity of terminology. See PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 7,
§ 2(a) cmt. c (restating § 2(a) as meaning "a manufacturing defect is a departure from a product unit's
design specifications").
110. See Jurls v. Ford Motor Co., 752 So. 2d 260, 265-66 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (3-2 decision).
On the malfunction doctrine generally, see infra Part III.B.
111. See, e.g., Magnuson v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 844 S.W.2d 448, 455 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)
(stating that"a showing of non-conformity to design... is illustrative of one form ofproof which may
be presented").
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whether the product in question was produced or assembled in a manner contrary
to the manufacturer's intentions.
Permitting a plaintiff to establish an accident-product's defectiveness simply
by comparing its characteristics to those of a like product unit found on a retailer's
shelf 12 has interesting practical and ethical implications. As a practical matter, this
liability standard means that the defectiveness of an accident product often may be
determined prior to filing a lawsuit. The plaintiffs expert, after locating another
product unit of the same make and model, may simply compare and contrast the
two products to ascertain whether the accident is fairly traceable to some physical
difference between the two product units resulting from some variation in the
production process. In some cases, no doubt, an expert will be unable to reliably
determine defectiveness or causation simply by comparing two product units."3
Oftentimes, however, a simple comparative analysis will provide a firm basis for
determining whether a product accident in fact was caused by a flaw in
manufacture.
Certain strategic and ethical implications spring from this ready availability of
a relatively simple test of manufacturing defectiveness. In particular, it would seem
that plaintiffs' attorneys handling manufacturing defect cases must seek to obtain
such comparative analyses prior to filing suit."4 Similarly, once defense counsel
gain access to accident products in manufacturing defect cases, they must compare
those product units to the manufacturer's design specifications and conform the
defense of such cases to the results of those comparisons.
B. Product Malfunction
1. Nature ofDoctrine
In modem products liability litigation, it is axiomatic that a plaintiff normally
must prove that a product was defective, that the product contained the defect when
it left the defendant's control, and that the defect proximately caused the plaintiffs
harm."'5 A plaintiffwho fails to establish each of these elements by a preponderance
of the evidence fails to make a prima facie case." 6 If a manufacturing defect causes
112. Literally or metaphorically.
113. For example, in the McKenzie case discussed above, the measurements were so precise that
a reliable defectiveness determination may have been possible only because the experts were able to
compare the measurements of the accident product against the measurements and tolerances actually
specified by the manufacturer. McKenzie, 650 N.E.2d at 614-15.
114. See FED.R.CIV.P. 11.
115. See Myrlak v. Port Auth., 723 A.2d 45, 52 (N.J. 1999); Davis v. Berwind Corp., 690 A.2d
186,190 (Pa. 1997); see also Rone v. Sharp Elec. Corp., No. C.N.A. 98-2560-GTV, 2000 WL 133822,
at *2 (D. Kan. Jan. 14, 2000); WLLwi L. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 103, at 671-72 (4th ed.
1971).
116. This is certainly true for strict liability in tort. See I MADDEN & OwEN ON PRODUcrS
LIABILITY, supra note 7, § 5:3. It is also generally true as well for negligence and breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability. See, e.g., Riley v. De'Longhi Corp., No. 99-2305, 2000 WL
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a product accident, usually the plaintiff can prove the defect and its causal relation
to both the manufacturer and the accident largely by direct evidence-as by
testimony from an expert that the product contained an identifiable production flaw,
deviating from design specifications, that caused the product to fail in a particular
manner.11 7 Sometimes, however, a product may malfunction under circumstances
suggesting a manufacturing defect (or possibly a design defect). 8 but without
leaving any direct physical evidence as to how or why, specifically, the product
failed to operate properly. In such cases, the absence of direct evidence of product
defectiveness and causation hampers a plaintiffs efforts to establish a prima facie
products liability case.
In negligence law, if the specific cause of a product malfunction is unknown,
the doctrine ofres ipsa loquitur allows ajury to infer the manufacturer's negligence
when the circumstances of the accident suggest that the product was negligently
manufactured or designed. However, because the res ipsa doctrine is designed to
establish a defendant's negligence rather than a product's defectiveness, most courts
consider the res ipsa doctrine technically inapplicable to strict liability in tort or
breach of warranty, both of which are unconcerned with a defendant's conduct." 9
Although not entirely necessary, 2 ° the courts, in an effort to maintain a fundamental
distinction between negligence and strict liability, began at an early date to tailor
1690183, at **2 (4th Cir., Oct. 30,2000) (noting that requirements apply to strict liability, negligence,
and breach of warranty).
117. See supra Part III.A.
118. SeePRODUCTSLIABILITYRESTATEMENTsupra note 7, § 3 cmt. b. However, the malfunction
"doctrine is ill-suited to cases involving defective design for failure to include a safety device." Dancy
v. Hyster Co., 127 F.3d 649, 653 (8th Cir. 1997).
119. See, e.g., Myrlak, 723 A.2d at 53 ("Res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine created under the fault
theory of negligence as a means of circumstantially proving a defendant's lack of due care. Strict
products liability, on the other hand, is a theory of liability based upon allocating responsibility
regardless of a defendant's unreasonableness, negligence, or fault."). This is the majority rule. See
also O'Connor v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. CV 89028104, 1997 WL 792996, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Apr. 25, 1997) ("Res ipsa loquitur relates to cases involving negligence and has no application to
cases where a strict liability theory is advanced."); Tresham v. Ford Motor Co., 79 Cal. Rptr. 883,886
(Ct. App. 1969) ("When a party relies on the rule of strict liability the requirement of showing a defect
cannot be satisfied by reliance on the doctrine ofres ipsa loquitur."). On the relationship between res
ipsa loquitur and the malfunction doctrine, see Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140, 1143 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
A couple ofcourts allow plaintiffs to use res ipsa to establish defectiveness forpurposes ofstrict
products liability. See Jurls v. Ford Motor Co., 752 So. 2d 260, 265 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (explaining
that res ipsa may be used to establish liability under statute defining manufacturing defect as a
deviation from manufacturer's design specifications).
120. Unnecessary because a negligence claim requires proofof each element of a strict products
liability claim, including defectiveness, plus the additional element of fault. See 1 MADDEN& OWEN
ONPRODUCTS LiABiLiTY, supra note 7, §§ 2:1,5.9. Thus, proofofa manufacturer's negligence under
res ipsa logically includes within itself proof that the product was defective.
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principles similar to those that underlie res ipsa loquitur2 1 into a separate doctrine
forproving claims in strictproducts liability. 12 Dubbed the "malfunctiontheory, '
these special principles of circumstantial evidence now provide a widely accepted
means for proving defectiveness in cases where direct evidence of defectiveness is
unavailable. 1
24
Under the malfunction doctrine, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of
product defect by proving that the product failed in normal use under circumstances
suggesting a product defect. Put otherwise, a product defect may be inferred by
circumstantial evidence that (1) the product malfunctioned, (2) the malfunction
occurred during proper use, and (3) the product had not been altered or misused in
a manner that probably caused the malfunction. The malfunction doctrine may be
described less formally as providing that a plaintiffneed not establish that a specific
defect caused an accident if circumstantial evidence permits an inference that the
121. "Strictly speaking, since proof of negligence is not in issue, res ipsa loquitur has no
application to strict liability; but the inferences which are the core of the doctrine remain, and are no
less applicable." PROSSER, supra note 115, § 103, at 672-73.
122. See Greco v. Bucciconi Eng'g Co., 283 F. Supp. 978, 982 (W.D.Pa. 1967), af'd, 407 F.2d
87 (3d Cir. 1969); Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 418 P.2d 900,911 (Okla. 1965); MacDougall
v. Ford Motor Co., 257 A.2d 676, 679 (Pa. Super. Ct.. 1969). For the doctrine's even earlier warranty
law basis, see PROSSER, supra note 115, § 103.
123. Itisso calledin severaljurisdictions, including Pennsylvaniawhichhas themost developed
jurisprudence on this doctrine. See, e.g., Rogers v. Johnson & Johnson Prods., Inc., 565 A.2d 751,753
(Pa. 1989); Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 319 A.2d 914, 920 (Pa. 1974); Dansak v.
Cameron Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 703 A.2d 489, 495 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); Ducko v. Chrysler Motors
Corp., 639 A.2d 1204,1205 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); Troy v. Kampgrounds of Am., Inc., 581 A.2d 665,
668 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
A few courts refer to it as the "indeterminate defect theory," reflecting the fact that the doctrine
applies when the circumstances surrounding an accident suggest a product defect but no direct
evidence of a specific defect is available. See Riley v. De'Longhi Corp., No. 99-2305, 2000 WL
1690183, at *2 (4th Cir., Oct. 30, 2000); Myrlak, 723 A.2d at 55-56. The doctrine is also sometimes
referred to as the "general defect" theory. See Corcoran v. Gen. Motors Corp., 81 F. Supp. 2d 55, 66
(D.D.C. 2000). Without assigning a particular name to the doctrine, most courts refer to it simply as
a principle of circumstantial evidence.
124. See generally 1 AMERICAN LAW OFPRODUCTs LIABILITY 3D §§ 3:13, 17:68, 31:19-31:28
(1999); 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, §§ 8.06, 22.09 (discussing the general defect or
malfunction theory); Jonathan M. Hoffman, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Indeterminate Product Defects:
If They Speakfor Themselves, WhatAre They Saying?, 36 S. Tax. L. REV. 353 (1995) (discussing the
plaintiff's burden of proof in product liability res ipsa cases); Gary T. Schwartz, New Products, Old
Products, Evolving Lau, Retroactive Law, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 796, 828 (1983) (discussing the
"malfunction theory"); Mathew R. Johnson, Note, Rolling the "Barrel" a Little Further: Allowing
Res Ipsa Loquitur to Assist in Proving StrictLiability in Tort ManufacturingDefects, 38 WM. &MARY
L.REv. 1197 (1997) (discussingres ipsa andmanufacturing defects);Malfiinction Theory, Prod. Liab.
Rep. (CC) 1740 (discussing cases analyzing malfunction theory); Christopher H. Hall, Annotation,
Strict Products Liability: Malfunction or Occurrence ofAccident as Evidence of Defect, 65 A.L.R.
4th 346 (1988) (examining the malfunction doctrine); PRODUCTSLL4BILITYRESTATEMENT, supra note
7, § 3 (same).
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product, in one way or another, probably was defective. s
Since normal products liability doctrine requires a plaintiff to establish that a
product was defective and that the defect caused his harm, requiring a plaintiff to
prove that a specific defect caused the accident might appear to make good sense.
But the very purpose of the malfunction doctrine is to allow a plaintiff to prove a
case by circumstantial evidence when there simply is no direct evidence of precisely
how or why the product failed.2 6 Sometimes the specific cause of a malfunction
disappears in the accident when the product blows up, bums up, is otherwise
severely damaged, or is thereafter lost. 7 Not infrequently, however, products
simply malfunction, and mysteriously so, leaving no tangible trace of how or why
they failed. In all such situations, where direct evidence is unavailable, the courts
have properly refused to require the plaintiff to prove what specific defect caused
the product to malfunction. 2 '
Because the malfunction doctrine is merely a principle of circumstantial
evidence rather than a formal definition of what constitutes a manufacturing defect,
the doctrine is logically compatible with a definition of manufacturing defect in
terms of a departure from the manufacturer's design specifications. 29
125. "The inference of defect may be drawn under this Section without proof of the specific
defect. Furthermore, quite apart from the question of what type of defect was involved, the plaintiff
need not explain specifically what constituent part of the product failed." PRODUCTS LIABILITY
RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 3 cmt. c.
126. See I MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODuCTs LIABILITY, supra note 7, § 8:3.
127. The loss of a product that is the subject of a products liability action raises issues of
"spoliation" of evidence. See Torres v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 762 So. 2d 1014, 1017 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2000); Tracy v. Cottrell, 524 S.E.2d 879, 887-90 (W. Va. 1999); Dansak, 703 A.2d at 494; see
generally MARGARET M. KOESEL ET AL., SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE: SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES FOR
DESTRUCTIONOFEVIDENCE IN CIVILLITIGATION (Daniel F. Gourush ed., 2000) (discussing theproblem
of spoliation in civil litigation); 2 MCCORMACK ON EVIDENCE §§ 264-65 (John W. Strong ed., 1999)
(explaining when an inference may be drawn against a plaintiff for failure to provide evidence); 2
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 277-81 (James H. Chadbaurn, ed.
1979) (noting that the claimant's spoliation of evidence suggests an unfounded case); Laurie Kindel
& Kari Richter, Spoliation of Evidence: Will the New Millennium See a Further Expansion of
Sanctions for the Improper Destruction of Evidence?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 687 (2000)
(discussing spoliation of evidence in products liability); Michael L. Volin, You Have No Evidence But
You May Still Have a Case: The New Products Liability Spoliation Doctrine, 69 PA. BAR ASS'N Q.
129 (1998) (same); W. Russell Welsh & Andrew C. Marquardt, Spoliation of Evidence, 23 BRIEF 9
(1994) (same); Phoebe L. McGlynn, Note, Spoliation in the Product Liability Context, 27 U. MEM.
L. REV. 663 (1997) (same); Phillip Earl Wilson, Jr., Comrnent, DoctrinalMalfinction-Spoliation and
Products Liability Law in Pennsylvania, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 899 (1996) (same).
128. See, e.g., Stackiewicz v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 686 P.2d 925, 927 (Nev. 1984);
MacDougall v. Ford Motor Co., 257 A.2d 676, 680 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1969).
129. See Jurls v. Ford Motor Co., 752 So. 2d 260, 265-66 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (3-2 decision)
(relying on the deviation-from-specifications statutory definition ofmanufacturing defect and holding
that proof of product malfunction entitled plaintiff to jury determination of manufacturing defect on
basis of res ipsa).
[Vol. 53: 851
MANUFACTURING DEFECTS
2. Applicability
The malfunction doctrine is frequently applied to cases involving cars and other
automotive vehicles. In Ducko v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,30 for example, the
plaintiff was driving a new car13 ' on a dry road at fifty-five mph when the car
suddenly jerked to the right, the steering locked, and the brakes failed to respond.
The car crashed, and the plaintiff broke her back. No specific defect could be found
in the vehicle. The plaintiffs' expert concluded that the accident was caused by a
transient malfunction of the power system for the steering and brakes, whereas
Chrysler's expert postulated that the accident resulted from driver error. Because
the plaintiff could not prove the specific defect that caused the crash, the trial court
entered summary judgment for the defendant.'32 Based on the malfunction doctrine,
the superior court reversed and remanded for trial, holding that a plaintiff need not
establish a specific defect to prove a manufacturing defect but may establish a case-
in-chief by proving (1) that the product malfunctioned, and (2) the absence of likely
causes other than product defect.'33 Because circumstantial evidence of this type
would permit a jury to infer that the product probably was defective at the time of
sale,' the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Chrysler improperly
precluded the jury from determining the cause of the accident-whether driver error
or, based on the plaintiff's testimony of steering and braking problems, some defect
in the car. 3
In addition to cases like Ducko that involve the sudden failure of a vehicle's
steering 36 or brakes,'37 courts have applied the malfunction doctrine to other
130. 639 A.2d 1204 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
131. The car had been driven 1,655 miles since its purchase less than two months earlier. Id. at
1205.
132. Id.
133. Id. The Pennsylvania courts characterize such alternative likely causes as "abnormal use
or reasonable, secondary causes for the malfunction." See id. (quoting O'Neill v. Checkers Motors
Corp., 567 A.2d 680, 682 (Pa. 1989)).
134. See id.
135. Id. at 1207.
Mrs. Ducko's testimony of the erratic performance of the vehicle's steering and
braking systems, under the circumstances ofthis case, was sufficient to make out
a prima facie case of a manufacturing defect in the vehicle. The issue of strict
liability, therefore, was a disputed issue for the jury. Although a jury, after
considering the testimony of appellee's expert witnesses, may find that the
vehicle was not defective and that the accident was caused by operator error, it
was improper for the trial court to make such a determination summarily and as
a matter of law.
Id.
136. See, e.g., Stewartv. Ford Motor Co., 553 F.2d 130 (D.C. App. 1977) (involving vehicle that
was twelve days old and had 1,400 miles); Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 470 P.2d 240 (Haw.
1970) (involving vehiclewith 2,829 miles); Farmerv. Int'l Harvester Co., 553 P.2d 1306 (Idaho 1976)
(involving truck with 116,000 miles); Millette v. Radosta, 404 N.E.2d 823 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)
(involving vehicle that had 11,000 miles); Hunt v. Ford Motor Co., 341 So. 2d 614 (La. Ct. App.
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automotive cases in which a vehicle inexplicably accelerates, 38 changes gears, 39
catches fire,"4 or rolls over;14' in which a tire fails;' 42 or in which an air bag fails to
deploy, 43 deploys improperly,' 44 or spews acid on an occupant. 4 5 In addition to
automobiles, the doctrine has been applied to malfunctions of a wide range of other
products, as when a bottle of soda pop,'46 a glass baby bottle, 47 an aerosol can of
1977) (involving a steering wheel malfunction); Stackiewicz v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 686
P.2d 925 (Nev. 1984) (involving steering on an automobile with 2,400 total miles that suddenly
locked; routine maintenance performed at 1,000 miles); Moraca v. Ford Motor Co., 332 A.2d 599
(N.J. 1975) (involving vehicle with 11,000 miles); Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 423 N.Y.S.2d 694 (App.
Div. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 417 N.E.2d 545 (N.Y. 1981) (involving steering that seized up
at twenty-five mph); MacDougall v. Ford Motor Co., 257 A.2d 676 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1969) (involving
a vehicle that was less than one month old and had 143 miles).
137. See, e.g., Tweedy v. Wright Ford Sales, Inc., 357 N.E.2d 449, 450 (Ill. 1976) (involving
brakes that failed at 7,500 miles); Joseph v. Bohn Ford, Inc., 483 So. 2d 934, 937 (La. 1986)
(involving brakes worn at 7,716 miles); Snider v. Bob Thibodeau Ford, Inc., 202 N.W.2d 727, 731
(Mich. Ct. App. 1972) (involving eight separate occasions when brakes failed in a truck); Vernon v.
Stash, 532 A.2d 441 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (involving a failed parking brake); Darryl v. Ford Motor
Co., 440 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Tex. 1969) (involving brakes that failed on a truck that was three months
old and had 600-700 miles).
138. See, e.g., Wakabayashi v. Hertz Corp., 660 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Haw. 1983) (involving a car
that is one and a half years old and driven 22,577 miles); Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955,
956 (Md. 1976) (involving an accelerator that stuck without warning); see also Jurls v. Ford Motor
Co., 752 So. 2d 260, 262 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (involving a cruise control that apparently failed to
disengage).
139. See, e.g., Harrell Motors, Inc. v. Flanery, 612 S.W.2d 727 (Ark. 1981) (involving a
defective transmission); Williams v. Deere & Co., 598 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. App. 1980) (involving a two
year old tractor); see also O'Connor v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. CV-89-028104, 1997 WL 792996, at
*1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 1997) (involving a truck that lurched when ignition turned on).
140. See, e.g., Hall v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 91-36053, 1993 WL 410692, at *2 (9th Cir.
Oct. 15, 1993) (involving a vehicle that caught fire); Hinckley v. La Mesa R.V. Ctr., Inc., 205 Cal.
Rptr. 22,23 (Ct. App. 1984) (same); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 502 N.E.2d 651,
653 (Ohio App. 1985) (same); Anderson v. Chrysler Corp., 403 S.E.2d 189, 191 (W. Va. 1991)
(same).
141. See, e.g., Perkins v. Trailco Mfg. & Sales Co., 613 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Ky. 1981) (involving
new dump truck that was properly used and maintained which overturned).
142. See Taylor v. Cooper Tire& Rubber Co., 130 F.3d 1395, 1396 (10th Cir. 1997); Colboch
v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 670 N.E.2d 1366, 1368 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
143. See Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 210 F.3d 240,242 (4th Cir. 2000).
144. See Perez-Trujillo v. Volvo Car Corp. (Swed.), 137 F.3d 50, 51 (1st Cir. 1998).
145. See McEneaney v. Haywood, 687 N.Y.S.2d 547,548 (App. Div. 1999).
146. See, e.g., Embs v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 528 S.W.2d 703 (Ky. Ct. App. 1975) (involving
exploding bottle of soda); Robertson v. Gulf S. Beverage, Inc., 421 So. 2d 877 (La. 1982) (same); Lee
v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 188 N.W.2d 426,429 (Minn. 1971) (same); Dansak v. Cameron
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 703 A.2d 489, 491 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (same).
147. See Patterson v. Foster Forbes Glass Co., 674 S.W.2d 599, 609 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
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paint,"' a tansformer," a gas grill, ' a propane fuel canister,"' or an oxygen
tank's glass humidifier'52 explodes; an automatic coffee maker's glass carafe,"5 3 a
bottle of ketchup,'54 ajar of peanuts,' 5 or a silicone breast implantI56 breaks apart;
a television,"' a clothes dryer, 58 a portable heater,5 9 or an electric blanket1
6
catches fire; a crutch,' a grain auger, 61 a football helmet, 63 or a laddercollapses;' 64 a crane drops a load; 65 the blade guard of a power circular saw fails
148. See Van Zee v. Bayview Hardware Store, 74 Cal. Rptr. 21, 24 (Ct. App. 1968).
149. See Bich v. Gen. Elec. Co., 614 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
150. See Adkins v. K-Mart Corp., 511 S.E.2d 840, 843 (W. Va. 1998).
151. See Eaton Corp. v. Wright, 375 A.2d 1122, 1125 (Md. 1977).
152. See James v. Keefe & Keefe, Inc., 377 N.Y.S.2d 991 (App. Div. 1975).
153. See Rizzo v. Coming Inc., 105 F.3d 338 (7th Cir. 1997). In Rizzo, Judge Posner opined:
A carafe designed to be used for years, not months, breaks in half without being
dropped or banged or cleaned with abrasive cleansers or damaged in a flood or
fire. In these unusual circumstances the accident itself is sufficient evidence of
a defect to permit, though of course not compel, the jury to infer a defect.
Whether these were the circumstances of the accident was a jury question.
Id. at 343.
154. See Powers v. Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc., 219 N.W.2d 393, 394 (Wis. 1974).
155. See Welge v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 17 F.3d 209, 210 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, C.J.).
156. See Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Grimes, No. 05-95-01682-CV, 1998 WL 548729, at *1
(Tex. App. Aug. 31, 1998).
157. See, e.g., Rone v. Sharp Elec. Corp., No. 98-2560-6TV, 2000 WL 133822, at *1 (D. Kan.
Jan. 14,2000); Union Ins. Co. v. RCA Corp., 724 P.2d 80,81-82 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986); Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 406 A.2d 1254, 1255 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979); Fain v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 652 S.W.2d 163,164 (Mo. CL App. 1983); Bombardi v. Pochel's Appliance & TV Co.,
518 P.2d 202, 203 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973).
158. See Weir v. Federal Ins. Co., 811 F.2d 1387, 1389 (10th Cir. 1987) (Colo. law); Cassisi v.
Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140, 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
159. See Riley v. De'Longhi Corp., No. 99-2305, 2000 WL 1690183, at *2 (4th Cir. Oct. 30,
2000) (Md. law); Pearson Constr. Corp. v. Intertherm, Inc., 566 P.2d 575 (Wash. App. 1977).
160. See, e.g., Henderson v. Sunbeam Corp., No. 95-6391, 1995 WL 39022 (10th Cir. Feb. 1,
1995) (involving fire allegedly caused by an electrieblanket); Watson v. Sunbeam Corp., 816 F. Supp.
384 (D. Md. 1993) (same).
161. See, e.g., Varady v. Guardian Co., 506 N.E.2d 708, 712 (Ill. CL App. 1987) (involving a
crutch that "failed to perform in the manner reasonably expected").
162. See, e.g., Thudium v. Allied Prod. Corp., 36 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 1994) (involving an
allegedly defective grain auger).
163. See, e.g., Rawlings Sporting Goods Co. v. Daniels, 619 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981)
(involving a football helmet that collapsed after contact and injured plaintiff).
164. See, e.g., Gillespie v. R.D. Werner Co., 375 N.E.2d 1294 (Ill. 1978) (involving a ladder that
"failed").
165. See, e.g., Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 319 A.2d 914 (Pa. 1974) (involving a
brake-locking mechanism that failed).
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to close;'66 a staple gun fires a staple;'67 a winch cable snaps;'68 and many other
situations in which products have inexplicably malfunctioned.'69
3. Limitations and Effect
While courts have applied the malfunction doctrine in many cases to help
plaintiffs get to the jury when evidence of a specific defect is unavailable, plaintiffs
have lost many other cases in which they have relied unreasonably upon this type
of circumstantial proof.70 The doctrine presents a seductive but faulty shelter for
plaintiffs with insufficient proof of defect and causation, and the law reports brim
with decisions that recite the propriety of the doctrine as a general proposition but
hold it inapplicable to the facts.'7' The opinions in such cases frequently note that,
while the malfunction doctrine provides a method for plaintiffs in proper cases to
establish defectiveness and causation, the law will not allow plaintiffs or juries to
rely on guess, conjecture, or speculation.'72
Although the malfunction doctrine may come to a plaintiffs rescue when
circumstances fairly suggest the responsibility of a product defect, it is hombook
law that proof of a product accident alone proves neither defectiveness nor
causation.'73 Nor does further proof that the accident was caused by a malfunction
suffice to prove these elements. The crucial additional showing required of a
plaintiff in a malfunction case is the negation of causes for the malfunction other
than a product defect.
While malfunctions are sometimes caused by defects for which the
manufacturer is responsible, product failures also result from improper treatment
of products by users and repairers, and many products eventually simply wear out
from a long and possibly rugged life. Tires, for example, when worn enough, will
eventually blow out. Thus, if the plaintiff fails to show that he used the product
166. See, e.g., Skil Corp. v. Lugsdin, 309 S.E.2d 921, 924 (Ga. App. 1983) (relying on expert
testimony to find defect in blade guard); Agostino v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 345 A.2d 735, 740 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1975) (finding sufficient evidence for jury to establish "defective" blade guard).
167. See Senco Prods., Inc. v. Riley, 434 N.E.2d 561,563 (Ind. App. 1982).
168. See Lachney v. Motor Parts & Bearing Supply, Inc., 357 So. 2d 1277, 1278-79 (La. Ct.
App. 1978).
169. See, e.g., Dietz v. Waller, 685 P.2d 744, 748 (Ariz. 1984) (involving a new speed boat that
"disintegrated" at high speed during normal-operation); Marquez v. City Stores Co., 371 So. 2d 810,
811 (La. 1979) (involving a child's shoe caught in side of escalator); Lee's Hawaiian Islanders, Inc.
v. Safety First Prods., Inc., 480 A.2d 927, 929 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984) (involving fire
suppression system that failed to operate).
170. See Hall, supra note 124.
171. See id.
172. See Willard v. BIC Corp., 788 F. Supp. 1059, 1064 (W.D. Mo. 1991); State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 523 N.E.2d 489,496-97 (Ohio 1988); Woodin v. J.C. Penney Co., 629
A.2d 974, 976-77 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); Thomas v. Amway Corp., 488 A.2d 716 (R.I. 1985).
173. See Williams v. Smart Chevrolet Co., 730 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Ark. 1987); see alsoPROSSER,
supra note 115, § 103, at 673 ("The mere fact of an accident standing alone.., does not make out a
case that the product was defect."); Hall, supra note 124, at 363 (1988) (collecting cases).
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properly;74 or does not show that the product was not misused or tampered with by
other parties (such as prior users and repairers) who had access to the product; 7 5 or
cannot show that the product was properly maintained;' 76 or does not establish that
the product failed during a normal life span of safe use;.77 then a malfunction case
will fail. So, the malfunction doctrine will not help a plaintiff injured when her
butane lighter causes an explosion if she lights a cigarette while surrounded by gas
fumes in a boat her husband has just fueled up;1'7 nor will the doctrine assist a
plaintiff injured when his grinding disc explodes if he does not show that the prior
user had not abused it;-' nor can homeowners rely upon the doctrine when their
174. See, e.g., Corcoran v. Gen. Motors Corp., 81 F. Supp. 2d 55,69 (D.D.C. 2000) (involving
an alleged brake failure; because other evidence suggested driver error, summary judgment granted
for defendant); Cohen v. Gen. Motors Corp., 444 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (involving
a plaintiff reaching inside the car and releasing the parking brake while car was sitting on an incline
and in reverse gear, causing car to back over his leg); Saieva v. Budget Rent-A-Car, 591 N.E.2d 507,
516 (Il. App. Ct. 1992) (affirming summary judgment fordefendantwhere record supported inference
that plaintiffwas speeding over dark, wet, and bumpy rural highway and simply lost control of van).
175. See, e.g., Yielding v. Chrysler Motor Co., 783 S.W.2d 353, 356 (Ark. 1990) (involving
repairers); Farmer v. Ford Motor Co., 316 So. 2d 140, 141 (La. App. 1975) (involving use of car by
prior owner); Elliott v. Lachance, 256 A.2d 153, 156 (N.H. 1969) (explaining that hair loss from
permanent solution could result if beautician left solution on hair too long); Scanlon v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 326 A.2d 673, 676 (N.J. 1974) (involving a dealer repairer and wife as other driver).
176. See, e.g., Schlier v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 835 F. Supp. 839, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(involving a power circular saw blade that was dull and saw that was dirty).
177. See, e.g., Corcoran, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 69 ("[A]lthough brake failure in a new car gives rise
to the inference that a defect existed when the car entered the stream of commerce, this inference is
unavailable to the plaintiff, whose complaint involves a seven-and-a-half-year-old car which he drove
approximately 23,000 miles without incident."); Mullen v. Gen. Motors Corp., 336 N.E.2d 338 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1975) (involving a twenty-eight-month-old tire driven 24,000 miles and possibly driven on
while underinflated); Woodin v. J.C. Penney Co., 629 A.2d 974, 976-77 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)
(explaining there was no evidence of defect in cord of freezer that had functioned flawlessly for eight
years of continuous operation). See generally W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON
&DAviD G. OwEN, PROSSER &KEETONONTHELAw OF TORTS § 99, at 696 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS] (providing "[t]he older the product, the less likely it is that evidence
of malfunctioning will suffice as an inference of a construction flaw").
However, even if the product has had a long and full life, "[w]here a failure is caused by a defect
in a relatively inaccessible part integral to the structure of the automobile not generally required to
be repaired, replaced or maintained, it may be reasonable, absent misuse, to infer that the defect is
attributable to the manufacturer." Holloway v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 N.W.2d 777,782 (Mich. 1978)
(reversing a directed verdict for the manufacturer in a case involving a four-year-old car, driven
47,000 miles, that suddenly left highway and hit a utility pole).
178. Willard v. BIC Corp., 788 F. Supp. 1059, 1061 (W.D. Mo. 1991).
179. See, e.g., Jakubowski v. Minn. Mining & Mfg., 199 A.2d 826, 831 (N.J. 1964) (explaining
that plaintiff failed to show that grinding disc's failure was more likely caused by defect than by
wearing out or misuse).
There is no hint in the record as to the manner and extent of use of the disc prior
to plaintiffs use of it. Plaintiff failed to produce as a witness the workman he
succeeded or to introduce other evidence which would exclude prior
mishandling or overuse of the disc as a cause of the break. It is quite possible
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toaster-oven catches fire and burns down their home if the toaster may well have
lived out its useful life."80 But a plaintiffmust negate only the most likely alternative
causes of malfunction, and only by a preponderance of the evidence, so that a
plaintiffneed not conclusively disprove every conceivable alternative theory of how
the malfunction may possibly have occurred.'
By its very nature, the malfunction doctrine generally permits a plaintiff to
establish a prima facie case-proof of a malfunction together with the absence of
plausible causes other than the product's defectiveness-without resort to expert
testimony.'82 But if the testimony of the parties and lay witnesses, together with
common sense, do not remove the probability of other causes ofa malfunction, then
a plaintiff fairly may be required to exclude such other causes by expert
testimony.'83
that a weakness in the backing was created by inexpert or careless use during the
preceding operation, causing the disc to break when plaintiff subsequently used
it.
Id.
180. Walkerv. Gen. Elec. Co., 968 F.2d 116, 120 (lstCir. 1992) (involving a plaintiffs' toaster-
oven which was used daily for over six years where plaintiffs' expert admitted that shut-off
mechanisms on toaster-ovens sometimes wear out and need to be replaced).
181. In Welge v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 17 F.3d 209 (7th Cir. 1994), the plaintiff was injured
when a bottle of peanuts shattered as he attempted to replace the lid. The plaintiff testified that he did
not mishandle the bottle, but the defendants asserted that the plaintiff had failed to exclude causes for
the shattering apart from the bottle's defectiveness. Id. at 211. In Judge Posner's words:
Elves may have played ninepins with the jar of peanuts while Welge and
Godfrey were sleeping .... The plaintiff in a products liability suit is not
required to exclude every possibility, however fantastic or remote, that the defect
which led to the accident was caused by someone other than one of the
defendants.... Normal people do not lock up their jars and cans lest something
happen to damage these containers while no one is looking. The probability of
such damage is too remote. It is not only too remote to make a rational person
take measures to prevent it; it is too remote to defeat a products liability suit
should a container prove dangerously defective.
Id. at 211-12. See also PROSSER, supra note 115, § 103, at 673 ("The plaintiff is not required to
eliminate all other possibilities, and so prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt. ... [I]t is enough
that he makes out a preponderance of probability.").
182. Compare Perez-Trujillo v. Volvo Car Corp., 137 F.3d 50, 55-56 (1st Cir. 1998) ("[A] strict
liability claimant may demonstrate an unsafe defect through direct eye-witness observation....") and
O'Connor v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. CV89028104, 1997 WL 792996, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr.
25, 1997) (explaining that a prima facie case does not require expert testimony), with Silvestri v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 210 F.3d 240, 244 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[I]n order to justify dismissing a case because the
plaintiff has failed to present expert testimony, a court must find that the facts necessary to establish
a prima facie case cannot be presented to any reasonably informed factfinder without the assistance
of expert testimony.").
183. See, e.g., Booth v. Black & Decker, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 2d 215 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (involving
a toaster-oven that was allegedly defective and caught fire; plaintiff failed to present prima facie case
because expert's methodology fordetermining defectiveness and causation failedDaubert standards);
Corcoranv. Gen. Motors Corp., 81 F. Supp. 2d 55,69 (D.D.C. 2000) (involving alleged brake failure;
other evidence suggested driver error); White v. Grainger Co., No. 85-0933-C, 1998 WL 290663 (D.
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When a plaintiff successfully invokes the malfunction doctrine, a permissible
inference arises that a defect caused the malfunction, an inference which the
defendant has no obligation (and frequently has no evidence) to rebut.184 The
plaintiff still has the burden to prove both defectiveness and causation by a
preponderance of the evidence; the doctrine merely provides a circumstantial
method by which these elements may be proved in the limited class of cases in
which direct evidence is unavailable for some good reason. 85 "The plaintiff still
must satisfy the burden of proving that a defect is the most likely cause of the
accident, and therefore must negate the likelihood of other reasonable causes." '86
Indeed, because of the vagueness of this ephemeral form of evidence built on
circumstantial inferences, the plaintiff's burden of proof is especially important in
malfunction cases to protect defendants from unfounded liability. Thus, a plaintiff
must establish such a case by the probabilities, not just the possibilities, 87 and
where there is an equal probability that an accident occurred for reasons other than
a defect attributable to the defendant, the plaintiff's case will fail.'88
Mass. Feb. 16,1997) (involving a dimmer switch that started fire); Falcone v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,
13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 734 (D. Md. 1990) (involving a reclining mechanism on seat that broke in
rear-end collision); Brooks v. Colonial Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 579 So. 2d 1328, 1334 (Ala. 1991)
(involving brakes that failed).
184. See O'Connor, 1997 WL 792996, at *3.
[T]he circumstantial evidence rules established in these mialfunction theory cases
merely establish a prima facie case and permit but do not require a finding for
the plaintiff even in the absence of contrary evidence. Thus a defendant need not
come forward with rebuttal evidence to avoid a directed verdict. ... [T]he
burden of production does not shift....
Id.; see also Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140, 1151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (explaining that
"neither the burden ofproofor ... ofproducing evidence is cast upon the defendant"). But cf. Graham
v. Walter S. Pratt & Sons Inc., 706 N.Y.S.2d 242,243 (App. Div. 2000) (explaining that the inference
of defectiveness (and causation) raised by a product malfunction serves effectively to shift to the
defendant the burden of coming forward with the evidence (the "burden of production")).
185. See, e.g., Walker v. Gen. Elec. Co., 968 F.2d 116 (lst Cir. 1992); Ocean Barge Transp. Co.
v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 726 F.2d 121,124-25 (3d Cir. 1984) (V.I. law) ("[T]he malfunction
theory in no way relieves the plaintiff of the burden of proving a defect .....
186. Ocean Barge Transp. Co., 726 F.2d at 125.
187. See Mateika v. LaSalle Thermogas Co., 418 N.E.2d 503, 505 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
For circumstantial evidence to make out a prima facie case, it must tend to
negate other reasonable causes, or there must be an expert opinion that the
product was defective. Because liability in a products liability action cannot be"
based on mere speculation, guess or conjecture, the circumstances shown must
justify an inference of probability as distinguished from mere possibility.
Id.
188. "Evidence which points equally to a cause for which the defendants are responsible and
to one for which the defendants are not responsible is not sufficient to make a case of strict liability
in tort for submission to ajury." Willard v. BIC Corp., 788 F. Supp. 1059,1064 (W.D. Mo. 1991). See
also Mays v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 661 P.2d 348,360 (Kan. 1983) (involving a gas pipeline explosion);
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 523 N.E.2d 489, 496-97 (Ohio 1988) (involving an
automobile fire).
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4. Acceptance
Having spread across the nation with little fanfare over the last half century, the
malfunction doctrine has become a well established precept of modem products
liability law.'89 A substantial and growing majority of American jurisdictions'9"
(typically without the "malfunction doctrine" label) now accept this principle of
circumstantial evidence for proving defectiveness in strict products liability.' 9'
189. See PRODuCTsLIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 3, Reporters' Note cmt. b ("A huge
body of case law supports this proposition."). For the older case authority, see PROsSER, supra note
115, § 103.
190. Asserting that the doctrine is a minority rule, FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, list the
following jurisdictions as adhering to some version of the malfunction theory under whatever name:
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, D.C., Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland,
Missouri, Nevada, NewHampshire, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, West
Virginia, and Wyoming. To this list should be added at least California, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, Utah, the Virgin Islands, Washington, and Wisconsin. See, e.g.,
Perez-Trujillo v. Volvo Car Corp. (Sweden), 137 F.3d 50,55-56 (Ist Cir. 1998) (P.R. law) (applying
a version of the malfunction doctrine); Taylor v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 130 F.3d 1395, 1398
(10th Cir. 1997) (Utah law) (same); Hall v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 91-36053, 1993 WL 410692 at
*3 (9th Cir. 1993) (Or. Law) (same); Weir v. Fed. Ins. Co., 811 F.2d 1387, 1392-93 (10th Cir. 1987)
(Colo. law) (same); Ocean Barge Transp. Co., 726 F.2d at 124-25 (V.I. law) (same); Rudd v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1344-46 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (same); White v. W.W. Grainger Co.,
No. 85-0986, 1988 WL 290663 at *2-3(D. Mass. Feb. 16, 1988) (same); Hinckley v. La Mesa R.V.
Ctr., Inc., 205 Cal. Rptr. 22, 28-29 (Ct. App. 1984) (same); Skil Corp. v. Lugsdin, 309 S.E.2d 921,
923-24 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (same); Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 470 P.2d 240,243-44 (fHaw.
1970) (same); Ford Motor Co. v. Reed, 689 N.E.2d 751,754-55 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (same); Perkins
v. Trailco Mfg. & Sales Co., 613 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Ky. 1981) (same); Snider v. Bob Thibodeau Ford,
Inc., 202 N.W.2d 727, 730 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972) (same); Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
188 N.W.2d 426,433 (Minn. 1971) (same) ; Rix v. Gen. Motors Corp., 723 P.2d 195, 203-04 (Mont.
1986) (same); Myrlak v. Port Auth., 723 A.2d 45, 52 (N.J. 1999) (same); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.
v. Chrysler Corp., 523 N.E.2d 489, 494 (Ohio 1988) (same); Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 418
P.2d 900, 914-15 (Okla. 1965) (same); Thomas v. Amway Corp., 488 A.2d 716, 722 (R.I. 1985)
(same); Bombardi v. Pochel's Appliance & TV Co., 518 P.2d 202, 204-05 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973)
(same); Jagmin v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 211 N.W.2d 810, 815-16 (Wis. 1973) (same). While most
courts are less explicit than New Jersey in formally adopting the doctrine, each case above
acknowledges this method of proof for use in appropriate cases.
191. Because strict liability in tort is the chief claim in modern products liability litigation, most
applications of the malfunction doctrine have been in this context. But the malfunction theory is also
especially applicable to claims for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability which are based
upon a product's being "unfit" for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used. See U.C.C.
§ 2-314(2)(c) (1987). In Greco v. BucciconiEng'g Co., 283 F. Supp. 978,982 (W.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd,
407 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1969), the court explained: "[W]hen machinery 'malfunctions', it obviously lacks
fitness regardless of the cause of the malfunction. Under the theory of warranty, the 'sin' is the lack
of fitness as evidenced by the malfunction itself rather than some specific dereliction by the
manufacturer in constructing or designing the machinery." See also Estate of Triplett v. Gen. Elec.
Co., 954 F. Supp. 149 (WD. Mich. 1996) (involving a ballastin flourescent light that allegedly caused
fire); Collins v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 583 N.E.2d 873 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (involving fire in
dryer's electrical system); Genetti v. Caterpillar, Inc., 621 N.W.2d 529, 541 (Neb. 2001) (providing
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Certifying the propriety of the doctrine's widespread acceptance, the American Law
Institute in 1998 endorsed the principle in the Products Liability Restatement § 3.192
Courts and juries need to be cautious to apply the malfunction doctrine only in those
limited situations where, first, the circumstances of the case conspire to prevent the
plaintiff from establishing defectiveness and causation by ordinary methods of
proof, and, second, where circumstantial evidence in the case points fairly to some
defect attributable to the manufacturer as the cause of the accident. 93 In a proper
case, 94 however, it is difficult to see how any jurisdiction could reject some
properly formulated version 95 of such a well-established, 96 fair,"97 and logical 93
a thorough analysis); Dewitt v. Eveready Battery Co., 550 S.E.2d 511, 511-16 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001)
(reversing summary judgment for defendant on warranty claims); Sipes v. Gen. Motors Corp., 946
S.W.2d 143, 158 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (involving an airbag that failed to deploy).
192. PRODucrs LIABiLrTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 3 (1998). The Restatement provides:
It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff was caused by a
product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution, without proof of a
specific defect, when the incident that harmed the plaintiff:
(a) was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of product defect; and
(b) was not, in the particular case, solely the result of causes other than
product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution.
Id.; see also Myrlak v. Port Auth., 723 A.2d 45, 50 (N.J. 1999) (adopting Products Liability
Restatement § 3).
193. See PRoDUars LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 3 cmt. b; see also James A.
Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Intuition and Technology in Product Design Litigation: An Essay
on Proximate Causation, 88 GEO. L.J. 659, 672 (2000) (explaining that malfunction cases "constitute
a relatively narrow subset of products liability cases"); Hoffinan, supra note 124, at 380.
[I]t will be up to the courts to ensure that [§ 3 of the Restatement) is
appropriately limited to cases in which circumstantial evidence truly supports a
reasonable inference that a defect existed in the product at the time it left the
manufacturer's hands and is not simply a "catchall" for cases in which plaintiffs
are unable to sustain their burden ofproof of a specific manufacturing or design
defect.
Id.
194. Such as when a new appliance explodes or catches fire. See, e.g., Cassisi v. Maytag Co.,
396 So. 2d 1140, 1151-52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (explaining that strength of inference of
defectiveness from malfunction depends on particular type of product and that the stronger inference
of defect arises from dangerous malfunction in self-operating products like televisions and dryers than
in products like cars leaving highway whose dangers are to a large extent under driver's control).
195. The Products Liability Restatement's formulation is not ideal, which reflects the difficulty
of formulating a concise, general statement ofthe principle. A formulation of the malfunction doctrine
like the following might be easier to understand and apply:
If proof of a specific product defect is unavailable through no fault of the
plaintiff, the factfinder may infer that a product which malfunctioned was
defective at the time of sale if the plaintiff establishes that (1) the malfunction
was of a kind that ordinarily does not occur unless the product is defective, and
(2) any defect in the product was most likely attributable to the manufacturer and
not to the plaintiff, a third party, normal wear and tear, or other causes.
Consider also the commonsense formulation of Chief Judge Richard Posner: "If it is the kind
of accident that would not have occurred but for a defect in the product, and if it is reasonably plain
that the defect was not introduced after the product was sold, the accident is evidence that the product
20021
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principle of proof. In short, the manifest merits of this simple canon of
circumstantial evidence suggests that its acceptance should soon be universal.
IV. FOOD AND DRINK
From early times, people have relied on the skill and care of others to catch,
grow, gather, preserve, prepare, and provide much of the food and drink
indispensable to survival. Whether paid for with a beaver pelt, a copper coin, or a
modem dollar, food has always been the single most important product bought and
sold by human beings. Both king and pauper live by food and drink, just as both
may die by food or drink gone bad. And this essential fact of human life is as true
today as it was a thousand years ago. Because pure food is necessary to survival,
rendering most persons extraordinarily dependent for their health, safety, and very
lives on the care and skill of food providers, the rules that govern liability for selling
defective food and drink have long stood apart from those concerning other types
of products."
Defective food and drink can kill and injure human beings in myriad ways. The
types of defects in different types of foods span the gamut, from spoiled meat,"'
particles of glass in ice cream,2 "1 ptomaine poison in a can of pork and beans, °2 a
piece of metal in a meatball," 3 arsenic in biscuit flour,2" tacks or wire in a loaf of
was defective when sold." Welge v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 17 F.3d 209, 211 (7th Cir. 1994).
196. See PROSSER,supra note 115, § 103.
197. When a product "is lost or destroyed in the accident, direct evidence ofspecific defect may
not be available." PRODUCrS LIABILrrY RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 3 cmt. b. In this case the
malfunction doctrine "may offer the plaintiff the only fair opportunity to recover." Id.
198. See Brownell v. White Motor Corp., 490 P.2d 184, 187 (Or. 1971).
When the jury reasonably can find that the product is unchanged from the
condition it was in when sold and the unusual behavior of the product is not due
to any conduct on the part of the plaintiff or anyone else who has a connection
with the product, logic dictates that it is a distinct possibility that there is some
defect in the product.
Id.
199. "No man canjustify selling corrupt victual, but an action on the case lies against the seller,
whether the victual was warranted to be good or not. But if a man sells me cloth or other thing, [he
must] know the cloth to be bad [to] be punished by writ on the case." DICKERSON, supra note 48, at
20 (emphasis added) (quoting Keilways Report, 91, 72 Eng. Rep. 254 (1507)).
200. See, e.g., Salmon v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 76 N.E. 573 (Ill. 1905) (involving food
poisoning from spoiled mince meat); Prejean v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 457 So. 2d 60, 61
(La. Ct. App. 1984) (involving rotten roast that was "green as grass"); Swift & Co. v. Wells, 110
S.E.2d 203, 204 (Va. 1959) (involving food poisoning from pork shoulder containing staphylococci
organisms).
201. See Minutilla v. Providence Ice Cream, 144 A. 884, 885 (R.I. 1929).
202. See Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 176 N.W. 382, 383 (Iowa 1920).
203. See Jones v. QMRI, Inc., 551 S.E.2d 867, 869 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
204. See Ballard & Ballard Co. v. Jones, 21 So. 2d 327, 328 (Ala. 1945).
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bread,205 clam shells in a bowl of chowder" 6 and fried clam strips,20 7 a crustaceous
creature in a can of mackerel, 23 strychnine in a box of candy,20 9 a metal screw in
chewing gum,210 and glass,21' dead flies,212 worms, 2 13 condoms, 214 and mice2 5 in
Coca-Cola and other soft drinks, not to mention soft drink bottles that explode.216
But the prize for the most repulsive "food" item sold to a consumer probably should
be awarded to the seller of a can of chewing tobacco containing a human toe.217
The great majority of defective food and drink cases involve claims that the
foodstuffs contained "manufacturing" defects-hazardous objects, contaminants,
and other deviations from the safe and wholesome condition intended by the seller
and expected by the buyer.2"" Less frequently, foodstuff cases involve claims of
defects in design or warnings, as from serving coffee at too high a temperature with
insufficient warnings of the risks,2" 9 or failing to warn consumers of possible
allergic reactions from certain types of food. 0 This section examines the recurring
205. See Collins Baking Co. v. Savage, 150 So. 336, 337 (Ala. 1933).
206. See Koperwas v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 534 So. 2d 872,873 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
207. See Mitchell v. T.G.I. Friday's, 748 N.E.2d 89, 90 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
208. SeeJohnsonv.Epstein,No. 96-CV-215 (RSP/ONH), 1998 WL 166805 (N.D.N.Y. April 10,
1998).
209. See Whitehorn v. Nash-Finch Co., 293 N.W. 859, 860 (S.D. 1940).
210. See Hickman v. Win. Wrigley, Jr. Co., 768 So. 2d 812 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
211. See Watson v. Augusta Brewing Co., 52 S.E. 152, 152 (Ga. 1905).
212. See Floyd v. Florence Nehi Bottling Co., 188 S.C. 98, 100,198 S.E. 161,161 (S.C. 1938).
213. See Norfolk Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Land, 52 S.E.2d 85, 86 (Va. 1949).
214. See Hagan v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 804 So. 2d 1234, 1236 (Fla. 2001).
215. See Eisenbeiss v. Payne, 25 P.2d 162, 164 (Ariz. 1933).
216. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 437 (Cal. 1944) (involving
exploding bottle). Because these cases do not involve risks from consuming the beverage itself, they
are treated elsewhere. See cases cited supra note 146; see generally Craig Spangenberg, Exploding
Bottles, 24 Onto ST. L.J. 516 (1963) (examining bottle cases, including mice-in-bottle cases).
217. See Pillars v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 78 So. 365 (Miss. 1918).
218. See, e.g., Hickman v. Win. Wrigley, Jr. Co., 768 So. 2d 812, 814 (La. Ct. App. 2000)
(involving screw in gum); Otis Spunkmeyer, Inc. v. Blakely, 30 S.W.3d 678,681 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000)
(involving hard object in cookie).
219. The hot coffee cases normally involve claims of defective design (too high a temperature)
or warnings (failure to warn adequately of the high temperature and its capacity to burn), rather than
manufacturing defects. See, e.g., Olliverv. Heavenly Bagels, Inc., 729 N.Y.S.2d 611 (Sup. Ct. 2001)
(involving injury from hot coffee; summaryjudgment for defendants; discussing other cases). Liability
in such cases thus depends on rules that govern these other types of defects. See PRODUcrs LIABiLITy
RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 7 cmt. a; see generally Zachari Rami, Note, Courts-Split as to Whether
Consumers Injured by Hot Coffee Can Seek Recovery, 10 Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 310 (1998)
(discussing split in hot coffee burn cases). On punitive damages for coffee burns, see 2 MADDEN &
OWE ON PRoDUcrs LiABLrrY, supra note 7, § 18:3.
220. See, e.g., Livingston v. Marie Callender's, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 528,529 (Ct. App. 1999)
(involving failure to warn of risk of possible reaction to MSG in soup). Some cases have imposed at
least a duty to warn of the risk of a serious, possibly deadly, infection from contaminated oysters, even
though the risk normally is only to persons with cirrhosis of the liver, hepatitis, diabetes, high iron
content, or suppressed immune systems, which conditions diminish the ability of the body to destroy
the bacteria. See Cain v. Sheraton Perimeter Park S. Hotel, 592 So. 2d 218, 223 (Ala.1991); Simeon
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issues that arise in manufacturing defect cases involving food and drink."'
A. Early Law
Early law provided criminal penalties and civil remedies for the sale of
defective food and drink. Beginning in 1266, a series of early English statutes
criminalized the sale of "corrupt" food and drink for immediate consumption, '
and, by 1431, the civil law held purveyors of foodstuffs strictly accountable for the
wholesomeness of their provisions.2z Whether this special duty amounted to a
common law warranty of the wholesomeness of food is uncertain,' but American
courts from an early date assumed that it did. In an 1815 New York decision, Van
Bracklin v. Fonda,2 a seller of beef was held strictly liable for failing to disclose
v. Doe, 618 So. 2d 848, 851 (La.1993).
221. For early treatments of the liability of purveyors of food and drink, see DICKERsoN,supra
note 48; Charles P. Light, Jr. & Robert H. Gray, The Sale of Food and Drink at Common Law and
Under the Uniform Sales Act, 50 HARV. L.REv. 553-55 (1937); James McGuiher & Stanley C. Morris,
Handling Food Products Liability Cases, I FOOD DRUG COSM. L.Q. 109 (1946); Bradshaw Mintener,
Product Liability Law, 5 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 168 (1950); Rollin M. Perkins, Unwholesome Food
as a Source of Liability (pts. I and 2), 5 IOWA L. BULLETIN 6, 86 (1919, 1920); Note, Civil Liability
in the Manufacture and Sale of Foods and Beverages, 92 U. PA. L. REv. 306 (1944).
For more recent treatments, see Lars Noah, One Decade of Food and Drug Law Scholarship:
A Selected Bibliography, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 641 (2000); Dane Getz, Note, Products Liabilit-
Illinois Redefines the Standard of Merchantability for Food Products: Reasonable Expectations, 18
S. ILL. U. L.J. 637 (1994); Carl Crosby Lehmann, Comment, Artful Pleading and Circumstantial
Evidence in Food Manufacturing Defect Cases: Is it too Easy to Get a Jury?, 72 N.D. L. REv. 481
(1996); Rami, supra note 219; R. Lee Vanderpool, Note, Porteous v. St. Ann's Caf6 & Deli: Pulling
the Broken Teeth of the Foreign-NationalDoctrine, 74 TuL. L. REV. 379 (1999); Jane Massey Draper,
Annotation, Liability For Injury or Death Allegedly Caused by Food Product Containing Object
Related To, But Not Intended to be Present in Product, 2 A.L.R.5th 189 (1992); Jane Massey Draper,
Annotation, Liability for Injury or Death Caused by Spoilage, Contamination, or Other Deleterious
Condition of Food or Food Product, 2 A.L.R.5th 1 (1992); see generally PRODUCTS LIABILITY
RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 7 (restating the law for "Defective Food Products"); FRUMER &
FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, § 48; Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) IT 30,002 H, 30,007. On English, Irish, and
E.U. law, see D.J. JUKES, FOOD LEGISLATION OF THE UK (1997); RAYMOND O'RoURKE, FOOD SAFETY
AND PRODUCT LIABILITY (2000); RAYMOND O'RouRKE, EUROPEAN FOOD LAW (1998).
222. See DICKERSON, supra note 48, at 20.
223. "A taverner or vintner was bound as such to sell wholesome food and drink." F.B. Ames,
The History ofAssumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REv. 1, 9 (1888). The case decided in 1431 provided: "[I]f I
come into a tavern to eat and the taverner gives and sells me beer or food which is corrupt, by which
I am put to great suffering, I shall clearly have an action against the taverner on the case even though
he makes no warranty to me." Year Book, 9 Hen. VI, f. 53B, pi.37 (1431), quoted in DICKERSON,
supra note 48, at 20.
On the evolution of the tort-like warranty applied to food cases, see DICKERSON,supra note 48;
William L. Prosser, The Assault on the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099,
1103-10 (1960).
224. Compare HARRY C.W. MELICK, THE SALEOF FOOD AND DRINK 10 (1936) (stating yes), with
Perkins, supra note 221, at 8-9 (stating no).
225. 7 Am. Dec. 339 (N.Y. 1815).
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that the cow had been diseased prior to slaughter. Relying on Blackstone, the court
observed that a warranty of quality is always implied into the sale of foodstuffs
because "the preservation of health and life" requires the seller to be "bound to
know that they are sound and wholesome at his peril." 6 A century later,
recognizing the special vulnerability of food consumers, the New York court
reaffirmed the view that the special importance of food safety fully justifies
imposing strict liability on sellers of food and drink. '
Although American courts from an early date applied the ancient tort-like
warranty of quality to sales of foodstuffs made directly to consumers, ' the absence
of privity of contract often obstructed recovery, especially in cases brought in
warranty.m However, from the early 1900s,' 0 some courts, often intermingling
theories of negligence and implied warranty, began breaking through the privity
barrier to hold food sellers liable to third parties. " By the middle of the twentieth
226. Id. More fully, the court remarked:
[1]t is stated as a sound and elementary proposition, that in contracts for
provisions, itis always implied that they arewholesome; and if they are not, case
lies to recover damages for the deceit.
In the sale ofprovisions for domestic use, the vendor is bound to know that
they are sound and wholesome, athis peril. This is a principle not only salutary,
but necessary to the preservation of health and life.
In the present case, the concealment of the fact that the animal was
diseased, is equivalent to the suggestion of a falsehood that she was sound.
Id. at 339-40.
227. Race v. Krum, 118 N.E. 853, 854 (N.Y. 1918).
This rule is based upon the high regard which the law has for human life. The
consequences to the consumer resulting from consumption of articles of food
sold forimmediate use maybe so disastrous that an obligation is placed upon the
seller to see to it, at his peril, that the articles sold are fit for the purpose for
which they are intended. The rule is an onerous one, but public policy, as well
as the public health, demand such obligation should be imposed.
Id.
228. See, e.g., Van Bracklin v. Fonda, 7 Am. Dec. 339 (N.Y. 1815) (finding the implication of
fraudulent concealment of contamination, and possibly an express representation that the beef was
edible); see generally Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 164 S.W.2d 828, 831-32 (Tex. 1942)
(noting that the warranty in food cases was not the modem contractual warranty but the separate tort
law warranty derived from the action of deceit).
229. For cases against retailers or restaurants, where the absence of privity was held to bar
recovery, see Borucki v. MacKenzie Bros. Co., 3 A.2d 224 (Conn. 1938); Hazelton v. First Nat'l
Stores, 190 A. 280 (N.H. 1937); Bourcheix v. Willow Brook Dairy, 196 N.E. 617 (N.Y. 1935);
Shepard v. Beck Bros., 225 N.Y.S. 438, 440 (City Ct. 1927); Prinsen v. Russos, 215 N.W. 905, 906
(Wis. 1927). Forsimilarcases against manufacturers, seeNelsonv. ArmourPacking Co., 90 S.W. 288,
289 (Ark. 1905); Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 139 N.E. 576, 578 (N.Y. 1923); see also DICKERSON,
supra note 48, at 63-69 (discussing the "[w]ant of privity as a bar to recovery").
230. And possibly before. See, e.g., Tomlinson v. Armour & Co, 70 A. 314 (N.J. 1908) (citing
earlier cases); Mazettiv. Armour & Co., 135 P. 633 (Wash. 1913) (same); see generallyProsser, supra
note 223, atl 106 (discussing, inter alia, earlier cases).
231. For a more expansive discussion of these developments, see Prosser, supra note 223 at
1103-10.
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century, many jurisdictions had abandoned the requirement ofprivity in food cases
by enforcing a special food warranty in tort that ran to remote consumers.2
One such case was Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps233 in which a producer
sold contaminated sausage to a retail merchant who sold it to Mr. Capps. The Capps
family consumed the sausage, which killed one of the children and seriously
sickened the remainder of the family. In an action against the remote producer, the
court imposed an implied warranty in tort into the sale of food and drink running
to those injured by the defective meat, reasoning that this kind of strict liability to
remote food consumers is necessary as a deterrent to protect human health and life;
that remote providers intend that the food they sell to intermediaries eventually will
be consumed by someone; that most consumers, lacking the tools, skills, and time
necessary to inspect their food for hazards, are unable to protect themselves
effectively against dangerous defects in the foods they eat; and that legal incentives
for improving food safety are best placed on food suppliers."3 4 But it should be
noted that Capps was in the vanguard of developing doctrine on the privity issue,
and most jurisdictions continued for some time to prohibit warranty actions in the
absence of privity, leaving negligence for some time as the only form of relief in
cases of this type." 5
B. Theories ofRecovery
1. Negligence
Although most jurisdictions continued to require privity of contract in most
negligence claims well into the twentieth century, courts have long made an
exception forproducts that were "imminently dangerous," initially as to aproduct's
inherent condition3 7 and later as to its condition if defective.3 8 Food products were
so classified from an early date, such that the absence of privity quickly dropped
232. See PROSSER, supra note 115, at 539.
233. 164 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. 1942).
234. Id. at 829.
[W]here food products sold for human consumption are unfit for that purpose,
there is such an utter failure of the purpose for which the food is sold, and the
consequences of eating unsound food are so disastrous to human health and life,
that the law imposes a warranty of purity in favor of the ultimate consumer as
a matter of public policy.
Id.
235. See Prosser, supra note 223, at 1108-10.
236. This was so until rejected by MacPherson v. BuickMotor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916),
and its progeny.
237. Such products include poisons, guns, and explosives. See, e.g., Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing
Mach. Co., 120 F. 865, 871 (8th Cir. 1903).
238. See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1054.
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away as an obstacle to negligence claims. 9
Because of society's special concern for food safety, some of the early
negligence decisions held purveyors of food and drink to a standard of
extraordinary or utmost care.2' Today, however, consistent with the widespread
repudiation ofspecial levels of care,24' modern courts hold sellers of food and drink,
like sellers of other types of products, to the normal standard of reasonable care.242
Often, the easiest way for a plaintiff to establish negligence is by proof of a
violation of a pure food act which in many states amounts to negligence per se.243
But before a court may rule that a pure food act provides a basis for negligenceper
se, the defendant must have violated the statute, which typically requires a finding
that the particular foodstuffwas "adulterated"2" and which may allow a defense for
good faith efforts to comply.24
Without the assistance of a pure food act, a plaintiff may have difficulty
proving the negligence of the purveyor of defective food.2" This is particularly true
239. See, e.g., Freeman v. Schultz Bread Co., 163 N.Y.S. 396, 397 (1916) (finding lack of
privity did not bar recovery); Minutilla v. Providence Ice Cream Co., 144 A. 884, 885-86 (R.I. 1929)
(providing good summary of privity issue); see also Drury v. Armour & Co., 216 S.W. 40, 41 (Ark.
1997); Comment, The Decline of Caveat Emptor in the Sale ofFood, 4 FoRDHAML.REv. 295,296 n.7
(1935) (collecting cases).
240. See, e.g., Linker v. Quaker Oats Co., 11 F. Supp. 794, 796 (D. Okla. 1935) (holding to a
very high degree of care); Eisenbeiss v. Payne, 25 P.2d 162, 166 (Ariz. 1933) (imposing the "highest
duty known to the law").
241. See PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 177, § 34.
242. See Flagstar Enters., Inc. v. Davis, 709 So. 2d 1132, 1139 (Ala. 1997); Porteous v. St.
Ann's Cafe & Deli, 713 So. 2d 454, 457-58 (La. 1998); Bullara v. Checker's Drive-In Rest., Inc., 736
So. 2d 936, 938 (La. Ct. App. 1999); Jones v. GMRI, Inc., 551 S.E.2d 867, 870 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
243. See, e.g., Allen v. Delchamps, Inc., 624 So. 2d 1065, 1067 (Ala.1993) (involving
prepackaged celery hearts treated with sulfites in violation of FDA regulations banning their use on
fresh produce; asthmatic customer suffered anaphylactic reaction); Sonsky v. Phoenix Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 499 P.2d 741,743 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (involving metalic filings in bottle of Coke);
Chambley v. Apple Rest., Inc., 504 S.E.2d 551, 553 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (involving wrapped condom
in chicken salad); Koster v. Scotch Assoc., 640 A.2d 1225, 1228 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993)
(involving salmonella); Coward v. Borden Foods, Inc., 267 S.C. 423,426,229 S.E.2d 262,264 (1976)
(involving a hard object in "Cracker Jack" popcorn). Contra, Jones, 551 S.E.2d at 867 (noting that
negligenceperse doctrine inapplicable to food case).
244. See, e.g., Norris v. Pig'n Whistle Sandwich Shop, 53 S.E.2d 718, 723 (Ga. Ct. App. 1949)
(stating that barbecued pork sandwich containing piece of pig bone was not adulterated); Goodman
v. Wenco Foods, Inc., 423 S.E.2d 444,451-52 (N.C. 1992) (stating that a small bone sliver in ground
beef was not "adulteration"); Jones, 551 S.E.2d at 873 (noting that North Carolina law imposes duty
on restaurantnotto sell "adulterated" food); Allenv. Grafton, 164 N.E.2d 167, 174-75 (Ohio Ct. App.
1960) (holding that oysters containing shell were not adulterated).
245. For example, a criminal pure food act may provide an exception if the seller has acted in
good faith, as by obtaining a guarantee of wholesomeness from its own supplier. See DICKERSON,
supra note 48, at 282.
246. See, e.g., Livingston v. Marie Callender's, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 528, 538 (Ct. App. 1999)
(affirming judgment for defendant on negligence, but reversing on strict liability in tort, for failure
to warn of possible allergic reaction to MSG in soup); Porteous, 713 So. 2d at 457-58 (reversing
judgment for plaintiffon claim of restaurant's negligence for failing to find and remove pearl in oyster
2002]
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in the case of a food-product retailer who purchases the food and then resells it in
a sealed container, a situation which deprives the seller of any opportunity to
inspect for defects.247 But, in other cases, the seller's fault is clear.248 Also, some
courts allow juries to infer the negligence of a manufacturer or other seller merely
from the presence of a defect in the food.249
In cases where direct evidence of responsibility and fault is unavailable, but
where circumstantial evidence points to the defendant's probable negligence as the
cause of defective food, plaintiffs in most jurisdictions can invoke the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur.50 Speaking to this very point, Henry David Thoreau declared that
"some circumstantial evidence is very strong, as when you find a trout in the
milk.',2.1 In such cases, the circumstantial evidence surrounding the accident leads
to inferences that the food would not have been defective without the negligence
of someone, that the defendant's exclusive control over the foodstuff at the time of
preparation suggests that the negligence was that of the defendant, and that the
plaintiff did not contribute to the injury.5 2 Such inferences may be quite strong in
cases in which the consumer is injured by a foreign object in food or drink,
po-boy sandwich); Cain v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 757 So. 2d 712, 715 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (holding
that there was no proof that grocery store's bakery was negligent in allowing hair to get into baked
cake); Jones, 551 S.E.2d at 873 (affirming directed verdict in favor of restauranteur on negligence
claim for serving meatball with a piece of metal lodged inside).
247. See, e.g., McCauley v. Manda Bros. Provisions Co., 211 So. 2d 637 (La. 1968) (noting that
retailer is under no duty to open sealed container). At least in some jurisdictions, however, a food
consumer injured by a deleterious substance purchased in a sealed container may recover against the
seller forbreach of an implied warranty ofwholesomeness. See Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile
Co., 28 A.2d 913, 914-15 (Pa. 1942). On the sealed-container (or "original-package") doctrine or
defense, see generally 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODuCTs LIABILITY, supra note 7, § 19:1.
248. See, e.g., Flagstar Enters, Inc. v. Davis, 709 So. 2d 1132, 1137 (Ala. 1997) (allowing blood
from unbandaged cut to spill into take-out order of biscuits and gravy); Bullara v. Checker's Drive-In
Rest., Inc., 736 So. 2d 936, 937 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (allowing cockroach to enter chili dog, failing to
discover the roach lurking in dog prior to sale, and making sale to customer of roach-infested dog).
249. See, e.g., Bullara, 736 So. 2d at 938 (allowing inference by implication); Vamos v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. of N.Y., Inc., 627 N.Y.S.2d 265,270 (Civ. Ct. 1995) ("It has long been the rule that
a prima facie case of negligence is made out merely upon proof of the presence of the foreign
substance.., sold in a sealed container."); Cohen v. Allendale Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 291 S.C. 35,
38, 351 S.E.2d 897, 899 (Ct. App. 1986) (Bell, J.) (allowing inference of negligence).
250. See, e.g., Leikach v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., 276 A.2d 81, 86 (Md. 1971) (applying res
ipsa loquitur doctrine); Santine v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 591 P.2d 329,333 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978)
(same); Samson v. Riesing, 215 N.W.2d 662, 667 (Wis. 1974) (same). Contra Jones v. GMRI, Inc.,
551 S.E.2d 867, 873 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) ("[RJes ipsa loquitur does not apply in a case involving an
injury from the ingestion of an adulterated food product."); see generally FRUJMER& FRIEDMAN, supra
note 7, §§ 48.08[3], 48.10[2]. On the related malfunction doctrine, see supra Part III.B.
251. Henry David Thoreau, Nov. 11, 1850, in 2 THE JOURNAL OF HENRY DAviD THOREAU 94
(Bradford Torry & Frances H. Allen, eds. 1984).
252. See, e.g., Knight v. Just Born, Inc., No. CV-99-606-ST, 2000 WL 924624 (D. Or. Mar. 28,
2000) (involving severe chemical bums to mouth from eating Hot Tamale candy); Fender v. Colonial
Stores, Inc., 225 S.E.2d 691,696 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976) (involving injury from exploding soda bottle);
Giant Food, Inc. v. Wash. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 332 A.2d 1 (Md. 1975) (same); see generally
FRuMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, § 48.08[3][a].
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particularly if it is found in a package, can, or other container sealed at the
defendant's place ofbusiness.5 3 In an early case of this type, in which the plaintiff
encountered a human toe in a can of chewing tobacco, the court had little difficulty
in finding an inference of negligence: "We can imagine no reason why, with
ordinary care, human toes could not be left out of chewing tobacco, and if toes are
found in chewing tobacco, it seems to us that somebody has been very careless." 4
2. Warranty
In cases involving foodstuffs, as any type of product, warranty claims have the
distinct advantage over negligence that proof of the defendant's fault is not
necessary.'5s Although express warranty actions are unusual in foodstuff cases,
occasionally they do arise."z 6 Thus, when a seller of canned chicken advertises its
product as "boned chicken" that contains "no bones," a consumer injured by abone
sliver lurking in the chicken may recover for the seller's false affirmations offact.27
Much more typical in food cases are claims for breach of the implied warranty of
quality orwholesomeness." This latter form of warranty, now encompassedby the
implied warranty of merchantability, provides a strict, no-fault basis for liability
under the Uniform Commercial Code.29 While the sealed-container doctrine, 2
60
privity,26' and other sales law restrictions sometimes limit the reach of warranty law
claims, the courts have long and widely used the law of warranty to provide relief
253. Res ipsa has long been applied in this situation. See, e.g., Dryden v. Cont'l Baking Co., 77
P.2d 833 (Cal. 1938) (allowing res ipsa in "glass" case); Richenbacher v. Cal. Packing Corp., 145
N.E. 281,202 (Mass. 1924) (same); see also Minutilla v. Providence Ice Cream, 144 A. 884,887 (R.I.
1929) (noting that although res ipsa did not apply, inference of manufacturer's negligence arose from
presence of glass in ice cream served in its original package).
254. Pillars v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 78 So. 365, 366 (Miss. 1918).
255. See 1 MADDEN& OWENONPRODUCTS LIABILrrY, supra note 7, §§ 4:1, 4:5,5:9.
256. See, e.g., Cott v. Peppermint Twist Mgmt. Co., 856 P.2d 906, 911-12 (Kan. 1993)
(involving claim of express warranty where night club waitress told patrons that drink was "good"
whereas it was dishwashing detergent containing lye).
257. See Lane v. C.A. Swanson & Sons, 278 P.2d 723, 726 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955).
258. See, e.g., Jones v. GMRI, Inc., 551 S.E.2d 867, 869 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (involving a
breach of implied warranty where foreign object found in food); Otis Spunkmeyer, Inc. v. Blakely,
30 S.W.3d 678,681-82 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (same).
259. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (1987); 1 MADDEN & OWEN ONPRODUCTS LABLITY, supra note 7, §
4:5.
260. This doctrine may preclude warranty claims against retailers. See, e.g., Jones, 551 S.E.2d
at 870-71 (upholding judgment for restaurant on implied warranty claim on basis of statutory sealed-
container defense).
261. This doctrine may preclude warranty claims against remote sellers. See, e.g., Barnett v.
Leiserv, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (barring warranty action brought by child, burned by
hot coffee purchased and spilled by family friend in restaurant, because of lack of privity); Minutilla
v. Providence Ice Cream, 144 A. 884, 885 (R.I. 1929) ("[T]here can be no warranty without privity
of contract").
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to persons injured by defective food and drink.262
3. Strict Liability in Tort
With the rise of the doctrine of strict products liability in tort in the 1960s and
1970s, problems of establishing negligence and satisfying the technical rules of
warranty law fell away in cases involving foodstuffs as in other types of products.263
While negligence and warranty claims are still frequently asserted in foodstuff
cases,264 various advantages of strict liability in tort265 make this doctrine the
preferred theory of recovery in most such cases. Thus, purveyors of food or drink
have been held subject to strict liability in tort for injuries from mice in soft drink
bottles,266 contaminated oysters,267 a metal screw in a stick of chewing gum, 26' a
pebble in a biscuit,269 MSG in soup,27° human blood in a biscuit and gravy,271 and
many other situations involving defective food and drink.272
Regardless of the particular cause of action, two issues of proof frequently
predominate in foodstuff cases: defectiveness and causation. The burden of proof
262. See, e.g., Clime v. Dewey Beach Enters., 831 F. Supp. 341, 348-49 (D. Del. 1993)
(allowing claim for breach of warranty); Cott v. Peppermint Twist Mgmt. Co., 856 P.2d 906, 932
(Kan. 1993) (same); Creach v. Sara Lee Corp., 331 S.C. 461, 464, 502 S.E.2d 923, 924 (Ct. App.
1998) (same); see generally DICKERSON, supra note 48, at 19-170 (discussing food claims and
warranty law); FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, §§ 48.15-.19.
263. See 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 7, ch. 5.
264. See, e.g., Knight v. Just Born, Inc., No. CV-99-606-ST, 2000 WL 924624 at *3 (D. Or.
Mar. 28, 2000) (involving negligence and strict liability in tort); Holowaty v. McDonald's Corp., 10
F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1081 (D. Minn. 1998) (involving negligence, implied warranty, and strict liability
in tort);Campbell Soup Co. v. Gates, 889 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Ark.1994) (involving negligence, implied
warranty, express warranty, and strict liability in tort); Creach, 331 S.C. at 463, 502 S.E.2d at 923
(same); Cott, 856 P.2d at 912 (same); Otis Spunkmeyer, Inc. v. Blakely, 30 S.W.3d 678, 681 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2000) (involving implied warranty and strict liability in tort).
Negligence and breach ofwarranty are the only claims available in states that have never adopted
the doctrine of strict products liability in tort. See, e.g., Goldman v. Food Lion, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 33
(E.D. Va. 1995) (involving a pit in canned peach); Clime v. Dewey Beach Enters., 831 F. Supp. 341,
348-49 (D. Del. 1993) (involving bacteria in clams); Jones v. GMRI, Inc., 551 S.E.2d 867, 869 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2001) (involving metal in meatball).
265. See 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTs LIABILITY, supra note 7, § 5:9.
266. See Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 420 P.2d 855 (Nev. 1966).
267. See Kilpatrick v. Superior Court, 277 Cal. Rptr. 230,232 (Ct. App. 1991).
268. See Hickman v. Wm. Wrigley, Jr. Co., 768 So .2d 812 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
269. See Creach, 502 S.E.2d at 923-24.
270. See Livingston v. Marie Callender's, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 528, 529 (Ct. App. 1999).
271. See Flagstar Enters., Inc. v. Davis, 709 So. 2d 1132, 1133-34 (Ala. 1997).
272. See, e.g., Knight v. Just Born, Inc., No. V-99-606-ST, 2000 WL 924624 (D. Or. Mar. 28,
2000) (involving chemical bums to mouth from piece of Hot Tamale cinnamon candy containing
concentrated cinnamon oil); see generally Draper, supra note 221, at I (discussing cases involving
liability for spoiled or contaminated food); Draper, supra note 221, at 189 (discussing cases involving
liability for object related to but not intended to be in food); Valenti v. Great At. &Pac. Tea Co., 615
N.Y.S.2d 84, 85 (App. Div. 1994) ("[T]he plaintiff [has] the burden of proving that the food was
defective.").
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on both issues, of course, resides on the plaintiff.273
C. Proving Defectiveness-In General
To recover for injuries from ingesting food or drink, a plaintiff must establish
that the food contained some dangerous element that rendered it unwholesome or
"defective. 2 74 The concept of defectiveness in food and drink cases is basically the
same as in other contexts. Thus, a food or beverage item generally is defective, and
a seller generally is subject to liability in negligence, warranty, and strict liability
in tort for selling it, if the food product's condition is dangerous in a manner not
intended by the seller nor expected by the consumer. As with any other type of
product, a person injured by food or drink must establish its defectiveness-in this
context, that it was unwholesome,27 unfit for human consumption,276 adulterated,277
or contained a foreign or otherwise dangerous substance of a type that consumers
generally do not expect.278
Sometimes a foodstuff's defectiveness is very clear, as when a soft drink
contains slivers of glass,"' a condom,"' a slimy substance,"' a moth,212 or a
mouse;2" a meatball contains a piece of metal;284 a can of pork and beans contains
273. See, e.g., Cooper v. Borden, Inc., 709 So. 2d 878, 881 (La. CL App. 1998) (explaining that
to establish manufacturer's liability for harm from food consumption, plaintiff must prove that: (1)
defendant's product contained deleterious substance; (2) plaintiff consumed the substance; and (3)
the consumption caused the plaintiff's injury); Valenti, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 85 ("["]he plaintiff [has] the
burden of proving that the food was defective.").
274. See, e.g., Mann v. D.L. Lee & Sons, Inc., 537 S.E.2d 683,684 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (holding
that although plaintiffs probably suffered food poisoning, insufficient evidence that defendant's ham
was defective).
275. See, e.g., Slonsky v. Phoenix Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 499 P.2d 741, 742 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1972) (involving metallic filings inbottle of Coke); Sowell v. Hyatt Corp., 623 A.2d 1221,1222 (D.C.
Ct. App. 1993) (involving a worm in rice).
276. See, e.g., Johnson v. Epstein, No. 96-CV-215 1998 WL 166805, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 10,
1998) (involving a "foreign substance thatwas revolting or unfit for human consumption"); Goldman
v. Food Lion, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 33, 36 (E.D. Va. 1995) (involving warranty that food is "fit for human
consumption").
277. "Adulterated" is a common description of the condition in which food may not be sold
under pure food acts. See, e.g., Chambley v. Apple Rests. Inc., 504 S.E.2d 551 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)
(involving condom in chicken salad).
278. See infra Part IV.D.
279. See Peryea v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 286 A.2d 877, 878 (R.I. 1972).
280. See Hagan v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 804 So. 2d 1234,1236 (Fla. 2001).
281. See Cernes v. Pittsburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 332 P.2d 258, 260 (Kan. 1958).
282. See Simmons v. Baton Rouge Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 282 So. 2d 827, 828 (La. App.
1973).
283. The early soft drink intruder cases were collected in Arthur N. Bishop, Jr., Trouble in a
Bottle, 16 BAYLORL. REv. 337,362 (1964), which classified the cases in various respects. Glass was
the most frequent intruder into beverage bottles, followed by mice in the following conditions and
numbers: dead-16; dead, "fur oozing" Coca-Cola-1; "dead and putrid"--2; dead, "badly
battered"--l; decayed-2; decomposed-14; decomposed and swollen-i; skeleton only-I;
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a condom;... a can of spinach,286 a bowl of soup,287 or a candy bar288 is infested with
worms; or a chili dog contains a cockroach.289 Where a food's defectiveness is
plain, unless the danger was so open and obvious that it should have been apparent
to the consumer,29 its manifest deficiency renders it unwholesome, unfit, and
defective by any standard. In such cases, unless causation is in doubt, food suppliers
generally should want to avoid litigation unless the plaintiff's settlement demand
is excessive. In other situations, the defectiveness of a foodstuffs dangerous
condition may be in doubt. In the hot coffee cases, for example, most courts rule as
a matter of law that a hot drink's propensity to bum is not a defective condition but
an obvious risk that must be born by those who drink hot beverages.29 Similarly,
a food's defectiveness often is subject to challenge if the hazard naturally occurs in
the particular food, as a chicken bone in chicken soup, an issue examined below.
A plaintiff, of course, must establish that the food product really did contain an
improper substance, a fact which the plaintiff s testimony may establish. 2 But the
plaintiffs uncorroborated testimony that he or she swallowed a bug is not the
strongest type of evidence, and so a plaintiff who swallows or otherwise disposes
of the objectionable item, as a piece of metal or other hard object in a meatball293
or in a dish of barbecued spareribs,294 may find the lawsuit traveling a route quite
similar.295 Yet, even if the plaintiff has no direct evidence of a defect in the food,
small-1; unspeified-9. Flies, spiders, worms, and cockroaches also appeared with some frequency.
Id. Led by Louisiana, the "top" eight states (by number of reported cases) all were in the South. Id.
at 339.
284. See Jones v. GMRI, Inc., 551 S.E.2d 867, 869 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
285. See Gentry v. Stokely-Van Camp, Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 9259 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).
286. See Food Fair Stores v. Macurda, 93 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1957).
287. See Campbell Soup Co. v. Gates, 889 S.W.2d 75, 7510 (Ark. 1994).
288. See Kassoufv. Lee Bros., Inc., 26 Cal. Rptr. 276,277 (Ct. App. 1962) (describing plaintiff
"bit[ing] into a mushy worm. When she looked at the bar, she saw that it was covered with worms and
webbing; worms were crawling out of the chocolate and the webbing had little eggs 'hanging onto
it.,").
289. See Bullara v. Checker's Drive-In Rest., Inc., 736 So. 2d 936, 937 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
290. In Harris-Teeter, Inc. v. Burroughs, 399 S.E.2d 801, 801-02 (Va. 1991), the plaintiff s
daughter-in-law went to the grocery store and bought a birthday cake decorated with two white plastic
birds resting on white "clouds" which were part of the cake's design. Plaintiff ate a piece of the cake,
white bird and all, swallowing it whole without chewing. Quite soon she realized that she had a
problem, and the bird was surgically removed from her colon. Applying the plain view doctrine, the
court held that there was no negligence in supplying a cake ornament the same color as the icing. Id.
at 802-03.
291. See, e.g., Olliver v. Heavenly Bagels, Inc., 729 N.Y.S.2d 611, 612-13 (Sup. Ct. 2001)
(discussing other coffee bum cases and granting summary judgment for the defendant).
292. See, e.g., Johnson v. Epstein, No. 96-CV-215 (RSP/ONH), 1998 WL 166805, at *1
(N.D.N.Y. 1998) (involving a crustacean attached to mackerel in can shown to others).
293. See Jones v. GMRI, Inc., 551 S.E.2d 867, 869 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
294. See Kneibel v. RRM Enters., 506 N.W.2d 664, 665 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
295. The plaintiffs' testimony was found insufficient in Farroux v. Denny's Rest., Inc., 962
S.W.2d 108, 109-10 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (involving an affidavit of restaurant patron, allegedly
sickened from undercooked eggs, which conflicted with his own deposition, where medical records
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defectiveness properly may be established by circumstantial evidence and credible
expert testimony that the defendant's food probably was defective .
2
'
D. The Foreign/Natural and Consumer Expectations Tests
Defectiveness is clear enough, as mentioned earlier, when food or drink
contains a foreign object, such as glass, or steel, or bugs, or when the food is
spoilede 7 or otherwise contaminated."g Yet the parties' expectations and legal
responsibility may be quite different with respect to hazards that are natural to
certain types of food, such as clamshells in clam chowder, cherry pits in cherry pies,
and fish bones in fish fillets. To the extent that such naturally occurring objects are
dangerous, food purveyors ordinarily attempt to keep them out of the food and
drink they sell. But sometimes their efforts are unsuccessful and a food consumer
is injured by a naturally occurring object of this type. The question in such cases is
whether the food should be considered defective or whether such naturally
occurring objects should be expected and thus the responsibility of the food
consumer.
2 99
1. The Rise of the Foreign/Natural Doctrine
In Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co.,"' decided by the California Supreme Court in
1936, the plaintiff was injured from swallowing a fragment of a chicken bone
contained no evidence of food poisoning but only showed that he suffered from obesity and gout), as
well as in Valentiv. GreatAtl. &Pac. Tea Co., 615 N.Y.S.2d 84,85 (App. Div. 1994) (involving flu-
like symptoms after eating beans allegedly containing worm, where no mention of worm during visit
to doctor next day).
296. See, e.g., Gant v. Lucy Ho's Bamboo Garden, Inc., 460 So. 2d 499,501 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984) (involving food poisoning from egg rolls; doctor testified that the bacteria involved is usually
transmitted from fecal matter of infected person and that the egg rolls were the probable source);
Mushatt v. Page Milk Co., 262 So. 2d 520, 522 (La. Ct. App. 1972); Trapnell v. John Hogan Interests,
Inc., 809 S.W.2d 606,609 (Tex. App. 1991) (involving expert testimony, based onreasonable medical
probability, that permitted the conclusion that fatal allergic reaction was triggered by sulfite potato
whiteners).
297. See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. Wells, 110 S.E.2d 203, 204 (Va. 1959) (involving staphylococci
organisms in pork shoulder); Prejean v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 457 So. 2d 60, 61 (La. Ct. App.
1984) (involving rotten roast).
298. See, e.g., Claxton Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coleman, 22 S.E.2d 768 (Ga. Ct. App. 1942)
(involving kerosene in Coke); Cooper v. Borden, Inc., 709 So. 2d 878, 880 (La. Ct. App. 1998)
(involving penicillin in milk).
299. See generally PRODUCTS LiABILriY RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 7 (restating law for
"Liability of Commercial Seller... for Harm Caused by Defective Food Products"); Getz, supra note
221, at 637 (applauding repudiation offoreign/natural doctrine inNestle-Beich); Lehmann, supra note
221, at 481 (pleading and proving food foreign contaminant cases); Vanderpool, supra note 221, at
379 (discussing the Louisiana court's repudiation of foreign/natural doctrine in Porteous and
explaining that it is consistent with state Products Liability Act); Draper, supra note 221, at 189
(examining liability for object related to but not intended to be in food).
300. 59 P.2d 144 (Cal. 1936).
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contained in a chicken pie sold and served by the defendant restaurant to the
plaintiff. The plaintiff sued the restaurant for negligence and breach of implied
warranty, alleging that the food was not reasonably fit to eat. The trial court
dismissed the claims, and the plaintiff appealed. Stating that the defendant's
obligation in warranty was only to sell food that was reasonably fit, not perfect, the
court upheld the dismissal of the complaint."' While the court acknowledged that
even slight deviations from perfection may sometimes cause a food to be legally
unfit, it reasoned that "in certain instances a deviation from perfection, particularly
if it is of such a nature as in common knowledge could be reasonably anticipated
and guarded against by the consumer, may not be such a defect as to result in the
food being not reasonably fit for human consumption."3 2 Observing that the
warranty cases holding food unfit involved foreign substances such as glass, stones,
wires, nails, or foods that were tainted, decayed, diseased, or infected, the court
remarked that warranty law could not hold restaurateurs liable for serving a fish
dish with a fish bone, a cherry pie with a cherry stone, or T-bone steaks or beef stew
with bones "natural to the type of meat served.""3 3 Hence, "[b]ones which are
natural to the type of meat served cannot legitimately be called a foreign substance,
and a consumer who eats meat dishes ought to anticipate and be on his guard
against the presence ofsuch bones."3 4 Thus, because such naturally occurring risks
are to be expectedby the food consumer, neither implied warranty30 5 nor negligence
compels a restaurant to assure that its chicken pies are perfectly free of chicken
bones.3"
The Mix approach to liability for naturally occurring hazards in food and drink,
which came to be known as the "foreign/natural" test or doctrine, held that sellers
are subject to liability for injuries from objects that are "foreign" to a food's
ingredients, but that consumers should expect and thereby bear the risks of hazards
that are in some way "natural" to the food.307 At a time when rules of law were an
accepted judicial method for avoiding jury trials in recurring situations where
responsibility was clear,0 8 the foreign/natural doctrine appeared to be a sensible
way for courts to short-circuit needlessly repetitive litigation. As time went by, a
number of jurisdictions adopted the doctrine and applied it to such perils as bones
and bone slivers in dressing served with a roast turkey dinner,309 a pork chop," 0
301. Id. at 147.
302. Id. at 147-48.
303. Id. at 148.
304. Id.
305. The result is different under express warranty if the seller affirms that the product is "boned
chicken" which has "no bones." See, e.g., Lane v. C.A. Swanson & Sons, 278 P.2d 723, 726 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1955) (allowing claim under express warranty).
306. Mix, 59 P.2d at 148.
307. Id.
308. See generally DAN B. DOBS, TH- LAW OF TORTS § 132 (2000) (discussing "rule of law"
and the courts' authority to direct a verdict); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 177, § 35.
309. Silva v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 83 P.2d 76, 76 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938).
310. Brown v. Nebiker, 296 N.W. 366, 367 (Iowa 1941).
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creamed chicken,3" barbecue pork sausage,3" and fish chowder;313 a piece of
broken prune pit in a jar of prune butter;314 a crystallized grain of corn in a box of
Corn Flakes;315 and an unshelled filbert in ajar of shelled nuts.316
2. The Shift to a Consumer Expectations Test
Although a number of courts applied the foreign/natural doctrine as a method
for determining the defectiveness of food in certain types of cases, the test never
was adopted in more than a handful ofjurisdictions. In 1951, America's leading
food-law scholar, Professor Reed Dickerson, argued that the foreign/natural inquiry
should be rejected in favor of a determination of consumer expectations.1 7 And
during the 1950s, courts began to manifest their discontent with the doctrine's
applicability to processed foods by refocusing the inquiry away from whether the
offending object naturally and initially occurred in some ingredient of the food to
whether it was appropriate to the food as it ultimately was served.311 This shift in
analytical approach narrowed the doctrine into oblivion by allowing claims for
bones in chicken soup,3" 9 sausage,32' and canned chicken labeled "boned."32'
Moreover, at least a couple of fairly early decisions rejected the foreign/natural test
outright, reasoning that the decisive issue should not be whether an ingredient was
natural or foreign to the food at some stage of preparation, but whether the
consumer might reasonably expect to find such a substance in the type of food
311. Goodwin v. Country Club of Peoria, 54 N.E.2d 612, 613 (111. App. Ct. 1944).
312. Norris v. Pig'n Whistle Sandwich Shop, 53 S.E.2d 718, 720 (Ga. Ct. App. 1949).
313. Websterv. Blue Ship Tea Room, Inc., 198 N.E.2d 309,312 (Mass. 1964) (offering a history
of and several recipes for New England chowder (a "gustatory adventure") and observing: "We
should be prepared to cope with the hazards of fish bones, the occasional presence of which in
chowders is, it seems to us, to be anticipated, and which, in the light of a hallowed tradition, do not
impair their fitness or merchantability.").
314. Courter v. Dilbert Bros., 186 N.Y.S.2d 334, 336 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
315. Adams v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 112 S.E.2d 92, 93 (N.C. 1960).
316. See Coffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 226 S.E.2d 534, 535 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976).
317. "The better test of what is legally defective appears to be what consumers customarily
expect and guard against. Canned foods are expected to be found already washed, cleaned, and
trimmed, while the same foods in fresh form normally call for work of that sort by the consumer." See
DICKERsON, supra note 48, at 185.
318. See infra notes 319-21.
319. See Wood v. Waldorf Sys., Inc., 83 A.2d 90, 93 (RI. 1951).
[Even if chicken bones were necessary to the preparation of chicken soup], the
question is not whether the substance may have been natural or proper at some
time in the early stages of preparation of this kind of soup, but whether the
presence of such substance, if it is harmful and makes the food unfit for human
consumption, is natural and ordinarily expected to be in the final product which
is impliedly represented as fit for human consumption.
Id.
320. Lore v. De Simone Bros., 172 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
321. Bryer v. Rath Packing Co., 156 A.2d 442, 444 (Md. 1959).
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involved.322
As modem principles of products liability law established a foothold in the
1960s and 1970s, criticism of the foreign/natural doctrine accelerated. During this
period, courts and commentators began to recognize the inconsistency between the
caveat emptor principles inherent in this doctrine and the consumer protection
objectives of modem products liability law.3" As time progressed, courts in the
1980s and 1990s increasingly adopted a reasonable324 consumer expectations
standard, often explicitly rejecting the foreign/natural doctrine, for determining the
defectiveness of food.125 Typical of these decisions was Jackson v. Nestle-Beich,
322. See, e.g., Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 28 A.2d 913, 914 (Pa. 1942)
(involving oyster shell in can of oysters); Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp., 103 N.W.2d 64, 67 (Wis. 1960)
(involving chicken bone in chicken sandwich).
323. See, e.g., Hochberg v. O'Donnell's Rest., Inc., 272 A.2d 846,848-49 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971)
(involving pit in olive); Zabner v. Howard Johnson's, Inc., 201 So. 2d 824, 826 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1967) (involving walnut shell in maple walnut ice cream: "Naturalness of the substance to any
ingredients in the food served is important only in determining whether the consumer may reasonably
expect to find such substance in the particular type of dish or style of food served."); Stark v. Chock
Full O'Nuts, 356 N.Y.S.2d 403, 404 (App. Div. 1974) (involving walnut shell in nutted cheese
sandwich);Williams v. Braum Ice Cream Stores, Inc., 534 P.2d 700, 701 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974)
(involving cherry seed or pit in cherry-pecanice cream); Jim Dandy Fast Foods, Inc. v. Carpenter, 535
S.W.2d 786, 790 (Tex. App. 1976) (involving piece of bone in chicken meat); Betehia v. Cape Cod
Corp., 103 N.W.2d 64, 67-68 (Wis. 1960) (recognizing "reasonable expectation" test). Compare
O'Dell v. DeJean's Packing Co., 585 P.2d 399, 401-02 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978) (whether plaintiff
should have expected to find deleterious item in packaged food is defense for pleading and proof by
seller). See generally Draper, supra note 221, at 189 (examining "foreign/natural" test cases);
Spangenberg, supra note 216 (suggesting Ohio should adopt the reasonable expectations test).
324. Note that the standard is framed in terms of a reasonable consumer's expectations, which
is an objective rather than a subjective test. See, e.g., Phillips v. Town of West Springfield, 540 N.E.2d
1331 (Mass. 1989) (applying reasonable expectations of an ordinary high school student). See also
Williams, 534 P.2d at 700 (holding that there was an additional question of fact whether individual
plaintiff acted in a reasonable manner).
325. See, e.g., Clime v. Dewey Beach Enters., 831 F. Supp. 341, 348 (D. Del. 1993) ("[T]he
foreign natural test is an outdated relic."); Yong Cha Hong v. Marriott Corp., 656 F. Supp. 445, 448
(D. Md. 1987) (noting that reasonable expectations test "had largely displaced the natural/foreign
test"); Morrison's Cafeteria of Montgomery, Inc. v. Haddox, 431 So. 2d 975,978 (Ala. 1983) (stating
that the foreign substance test if flawed because it does not account for consumer expectations);
Jackson v. Nestle-Beich, Inc., 589 N.E.2d 547, 549 (111. 1992) (explaining that foreign-natural test
is an "outdated and discredited doctrine"); Phillips, 540 N.E.2d at 1332-33 ("The reasonable
expectations test has been generally recognized as preferable to the foreign substance-natural
substance test."); Langiulli v. Bumble Bee Seafood, Inc., 604 N.Y.S.2d 1020, 1021 (Sup. Ct. 1993)
(explaining that the reasonable expectation, not the foreign-natural test, should be applied); Goodman
v. Wenco Foods Inc., 423 S.E.2d 444, 451 (N.C. 1992) (giving a thorough discussion of foreign-
natural test issues); Gates v. Standard Brands Inc., 719 P.2d 130, 134 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (adopting
"buyer oriented" consumer expectations test).
The legal commentators unanimously agree. See Michael J. Spak, Bone of Contention: The
Foreign-Natural Test and the Implied Warranty of Merchantability for Food Products, 12 J.L. &
CoM. 23 (1992); Brent R. Eller, Note, Tort Law-Products Liability-Implied
Warranties-Foods-Goodman v. Wenco Foods, Inc., 33 N.C. 1, 423 S.E.2d 444 (1992), 71 N.C. L.
REv. 2163 (1993); Charles R. James, Note, Products Liability-The Test of Consumer Expectations
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Inc.,32 a carefully reasoned decision of the Illinois Supreme Court which adopted
a reasonable consumer expectations test. There, the court rebuffed the defendant's
invitation to adopt Louisiana's then-existing3 27 middle-of-the-road approach
(subsequently adopted in California)3 28 shielding food sellers from strict liability,
but not negligence, for dangers naturally occurring in food products. 32 In the mid-
1990s, 330 the propriety of the shift from the foreign/natural doctrine to a consumer
expectations test was certified by the American Law Institute in the Products
Liability Restatement.33' In recent years, courts have rarely applied the
foreign/natural doctrine as a liability determinative rule,332 and the judicial march
For "Natural"Defects in FoodProducts, 37 OHioST. L.J. 634 (1976); Stacy L. Majica, Note, Breach
ofImplied Warranty: Has the Foreign/Natural TestLost its Bite?, 20 MEM. ST. U. L. Ev. 377 (1990);
Vanderpool, supra note 221, at 379.
326. 589 N.E.2d 547 (Ill. 1992).
327. Louisiana abandoned this approach inPorteous v. St. Ann's Cafe & Deli, 713 So. 2d 454,
457 (La. 1998), which shifted to a negligence analysis that weighs the naturalness of an item's
presence in food together with consumer expectations.
328. In Mexicali Rose v. Superior Court, 822 P.2d 1292, 1303 (Cal. 1992) (chicken bone in
enchilada), the California Supreme Court replaced the Mix doctrine with the following:
If the injury-producing substance is natural to the preparation of the food
served, it can be said that it was reasonably expected by its very nature and the
food cannot be determined unfit or defective. A plaintiff in such a case has no
cause of action in strict liability or implied warranty. If, however, the presence
of the natural substance is due to a restaurateur's failure to exercise due care in
food preparation, the injured patron may sue under a negligence theory.
If the injury-causing substance is foreign to the food served then the injured
patron may also state a cause of action in implied warranty and strict liability,
and the trier of fact will determine whether the substance (i) could be reasonably
expected by the average consumer and (ii) rendered the food unfit or defective.
329. For the traditional Louisiana cases, see, for example, Title v. Pontchatrain Hotel, 449 So.
2d 677 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (holding restaurant not liable for allowing pearl to remain in fried oyster)
and Musso v. Picadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 178 So. 2d 421, 428 (La. Ct. App. 1965) (holding restaurant
not negligent in failing to remove every pit in cherry pie).
330. In 1995, Tentative Draft No. 2 of the Products Liability Restatement § 2, comment g
suggested that the consumer expectations test was the majority rule. The far more decisive rejection
of the foreign/natural test in favor of the consumer expectations test first appeared as a separate
section in the Proposed Final Draft in 1997, and the Restatement was published in final form in 1998.
331. The Products Liability Restatement § 7 provides:
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing food
products who sells or distributes a food product that is defective under § 2, § 3,
or § 4 is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the defect.
Under § 2(a), a harm-causing ingredient of the food product constitutes a defect
if a reasonable consumer would not expect the food product to contain that
ingredient.
PRODucTs LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 7. In comment b, the Reporters note: "A
consumer expectations test in this contextrelies upon culturally defined, widely shared standards that
food products ought to meet." Id. § 7 cmt. b.
332. For remnants of the foreign/natural doctrine, see Mitchell v. T.G.I. Friday's, 748 N.E.2d
89 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000), in which the court schitzophrenically applies both tests in line with Ohio's
equivocal approach. See also Ford v. Miller Meat Co., 33 Cal. Rptr. 899 (Ct. App. 1994), in which
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toward the reasonable consumer expectations test appears inexorable.
In summary, modem courts have rejected the foreign/natural distinction as too
rigid a rule of law for assessing the defectiveness of food. While restricting liability
for natural hazards to appropriate negligence claims333 arguably strikes a nuanced
balance between consumer and seller obligations, most courts today prefer the
blunter but simpler consumer expectation protection approach of the type adopted
by the Products Liability Restatement. Absent from most discussions of the battle
between these two food defect tests is a recognition of the specially high protection
the law historically has afforded food consumers, as discussed above. Perhaps the
disappearance from common discourse of the high priority of food safety reflects
the fact that consumers in the world today confront a host of deadly
dangers-mechanical, chemical, and biological-which might suggest that food
products no longer deserve an elevated level of protection. Yet, perhaps, food safety
should still be viewed as a necessary first goal in the kind of broader human safety
plan the law must now construct. Be that as it may, food safety remains a vital
social goal that undoubtedly is better protected by the reasonable consumer
expectations test, which now is plainly the prevailing legal doctrine,334 than the
foreign/natural doctrine which properly is on the run.
3. Court and Jury
Even with the decline of the foreign/natural test, which is nearing extinction as
a general test of liability, the "naturalness" of a dangerous item's presence in a food
necessarily lingers on as an important sub-issue in assessing reasonable
expectations in particular contexts-that is, in determining just what types of
dangers consumers justifiably should be required to expect in certain types of
foods.335 While the task of ascertaining such expectations normally is peculiarly
well suited for jury resolution,336 reasonable consumer expectations sometimes are
the court held that a bone fragment was a natural substance to be anticipated in beef.
333. This is the former rule in Louisiana that is now applied in California. See supra notes 327-
29.
334. See PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 7 cmt. b, Reporters' Note 1
(explaining that a "strongmajority ofcourts" have applied the reasonable consumer expectations test).
335. Reasonable expectations is also used in determinations ofhow carefully a consumer should
chew. See, e.g., Hochberg v. O'Donnell's Rest., Inc., 272 A.2d 846, 847 (D.C. 1971) (involving a
restaurant patron who broke his tooth on a pit in an olive served in a vodka martini). Cf Scheller v.
Wilson Certified Foods, Inc., 559 P.2d 1074, 1081 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) (finding seller of smoked
pork not liable for death from trichinosis because it is common knowledge that pork must be cooked
prior to consumption; plaintiff thought pork already had been cooked).
336. See, e.g., Yong Cha Hong v. Marriott Corp., 656 F. Supp. 445, 448-49 (D. Md.1987)
(deciding whether the presence of a worm-like trachea or aorta in fast-food fried chicken fell below
reasonable consumer expectations was question of fact); Phillips v. Town of West Springfield, 540
N.E.2d 1331 (Mass. 1989) (allowing the trier of fact to determine the reasonable expectations of
ordinary high school student concerning the likely presence of a bone in his meal); Williams v. Braum
Ice Cream Stores, Inc., 534 P.2d 700 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974); see generally Getz, supra note 221, at 637
(discussing recent developments in food manufacturers' liability).
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so clear that courts should take the issue from the jury. For example, in an early
case that rejected the foreign/natural test and embraced the consumer expectations
test as the formal liability standard, the court nevertheless ruled as a matter of law
that the consumer should have expected to find an oyster shell in a serving of fried
oysters.337 More recently, courts have held as a matter of law that consumers should
expect that a fish fillet might contain a one-centimeter bone,338 that a can of clam
chowder 39 or fried clam strip" might contain apiece of clam shell, that a raw clam
served in a restaurant might contain harmful bacteria,34 and that a cake might
contain a strand of human hair.342 The contrary is also true: courts should rule as
a matter of law for food consumers who have no reason to expect a particular food
hazard, such as a lethally sharp sliver of bone in a fried strip of chicken, "natural"
though it might be. Modem courts have begun to reassert control over juries in a
variety of ways,3 43 and the decline of the foreign/natural doctrine in favor of a
consumer expectations test should not be viewed as a wholesale shift ofpower from
judge to jury. Instead, the battle lines for judicial rulings in foodstuff cases have
simply shifted-away from classifying food hazards as "foreign" vs. "natural," to
case-specific judicial rulings on when consumers, as a matter of law, should be
required to expect natural hazards in the foodstuffs that they eat.
E. Proving Causation
Even if a plaintiff can establish that a food or drink ingested was dangerously
defective, the plaintiff still must connect the defect both to the defendant and to the
plaintiff s injury or illness.3"
1. Linking Foodstuff to Defendant
It is fundamental, of course, that a seller is responsible for an injury only if the
seller was responsible for the defect-that is, only if the defect was in the product
337. Allen v. Grafton, 164 N.E.2d 167, 174 (Ohio 1960) (4-3 decision); see also Mathews v.
Maysville Seafoods Inc., 602 N.E.2d 764, 765-66 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (finding that plaintiff's case
failed under either test since "a consumer must reasonably anticipate and guard against the presence
of a fish bone in a fish fillet.").
338. Morrison's Cafeteria of Montgomery, Inc. v. Haddox, 431 So. 2d 975, 979 (Ala.1983).
339. See Koperwas v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 534 So. 2d 872,873 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
340. See Mitchell v. T.G.I. Friday's, 748 N.E.2d 89, 95 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
341. Clime v. Dewey Beach Enters., 831 F. Supp. 341, 349 (D. Del. 1993). But see Ayala v.
Bartolome, 940 S.W.2d 72, 732-337 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (deciding whether an ordinary consumer
would expect raw oysters to be contaminated with bacteria fatal to persons with liver disease is a fact
issue for the jury).
342. See Cain v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 757 So. 2d 712, 715 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
343. See generally William Powers, Jr., Judge and Jury in the Texas Supreme Court, 75 Tax.
L. REV. 1699 (1997) (discussing the proper role of courts in defining legal duties).
344. See, e.g., Meyer v. Super Discount Mkts., Inc., 501 S.E.2d 2, 6 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)
(involving food poisoning); Cooper v. Borden, Inc., 709 So. 2d 878, 881 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (finding
evidence supported assertion that penicillin was in milk that caused consumer's allergic reaction).
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when it left the seller's control. 34" Thus, even if the plaintiff proves that a Baby Ruth
candy bar contained a pin, the plaintiff still may be unable to meet his burden of
proving that the pin was in the candy bar when it left the defendant's candy factory
if the manufacturer introduces evidence of the rigorous quality control procedures
at its plant.3" Often, time is of the essence in establishing causation of this type. If
a plaintiff discovers maggots, "[liittle bitty worms with a black head," floating and
squiggling in chicken-flavored soup made from a dry mix sold by the defendant
manufacturer six weeks prior to the plaintiff's purchase, she cannot recover if the
larvae might reasonably have entered the soup between the time when the defendant
sold it and when her mother bought and prepared it.347
But a plaintiff need not prove the defendant's responsibility for the defect
beyond all doubt; the plaintiff may recover if the evidence, including reasonable
inferences from any circumstantial evidence, suggests the likelihood that the defect
was in the product at the time the defendant sold it.348 Thus, a plaintiff may recover
if she bites into a cockroach in a chili dog she had purchased earlier at a fast-food
restaurant if she establishes that she ate the dog shortly after she got home and
before her own household roaches had time to crawl inside.349 And while ajokester
conceivably may cram a mouse into a soft drink bottle after it leaves the bottling
plant, a jury may reasonably interpret dark fecal stains at the bottom of the bottle
as suggesting that the mouse resided in the bottle long before that point.3"'
2. Linking Foodstuff to Plaintiffs Harm
In order to link an injury or illness to a defective foodstuff, a plaintiff first must
connect the injury or illness to a particular food item sold by the defendant and,
further, show that it was bad.3"' When a person becomes ill shortly after eating, the
345. See, e.g., Mears v. H.J. Heinz Co., No. 02A 01-9403-CV-00058, 1995 WL 37344 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Jan. 31, 1995) (noting that a sliver of tin plate in bowl of soup that could have come from
sources other than defendant's control, even though expert testified that ninety percent of tin plate is
used in manufacture of tin cans).
346. See Tardella v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 576 N.Y.S.2d 965 (App. Div. 1991) (involving a pin in
Baby Ruth candy bar; in view of defendant's detailed evidence of rigorous quality control procedures,
plaintiff failed to meet burden of proof that a pin was in the candy bar when it left defendant's plant).
347. Campbell Soup Co. v. Gates, 889 S.W.2d 750, 751 (Ark. 1994).
348. See, e.g., Flagstar Enters., Inc. v. Davis, 709 So. 2d 1132 (Ala. 1997) (involving blood in
take-out order of biscuits and gravy); Slonsky v. Phoenix Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 499 P.2d 741,744
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (involving metallic filings in bottle of Coke; bottle appeared to be properly
sealed, and no other evidence of tampering); Cooper, 709 So. 2d at 881 (finding evidence supported
claim that penicillin was in the milk); Cohen v. Allendale Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 291 S.C. 35, 38,
351 S.E.2d 897,899 (Ct. App. 1986) (Bell, J.) (finding thatplaintiff's testimony thatthebug was lying
on the bottom of the bottle, that it might have been partially decomposed, and that no bugs were flying
around his office on the fateful October day was sufficient circumstantial evidence that bug was in
bottle at defendant's plant).
349. See Bullara v. Checker's Drive-In Rest., 736 So. 2d 936 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
350. See Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 420 P.2d 855, 858 (Nev. 1966).
351. See 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODuCrs LIABILITY, supra note 7, § 12: 1.
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natural tendency is to associate the illness with the foods or beverages the person
recently consumed. If any of the food remained unconsumed, it often is discarded,
which means that no samples may remain to test and analyze to ascertain whether
the food was good or bad. In such cases, courts properly allow plaintiffs to go to the
jury if they offer reasonable circumstantial evidence of defectiveness, such as that
a particular food item smelled or tasted strange.352 Yet without credible evidence
suggesting that a particular food item was in fact defective, the plaintiff's case quite
properly will fail.353
In addition to showing that a particular food item was defective, the plaintiff
must also link the defective foodproduct to the harm. In many cases, the causal link
between defective foodstuff and a plaintiff's harm is undisputed, as when the
plaintiff immediately is injured or sickened from consuming food that clearly is
defective, as a sirloin steak containing the tip end of a hypodermic needle5 4 or a
chili dog containing a cockroach. 35 But if the connection between defective food
or drink and a person's illness is not self-evident, as often is the case, expert
testimony may be required to establish the causal link between the defect and the
harm.35 6
A plaintiff who proves all three elements-(l) that food or drink was defective,
(2) that the manufacturer was responsible for the defect, and (3) that the defect
proximately caused the harm-may recover damages for the harmY7 If a plaintiff
352. See, e.g., Knight v. Just Born, Inc., No. CV-99-606-ST, 2000 WL 924624, at *13 (D. Or.
Mar. 28,2000) (finding that a burned mouth was evidence sufficient to establish that one piece of Hot
Tamale cinnamon candy produced chemical burns from concentrated cinnamon oil).
353. "A person claiming injury from consuming allegedly unwholesome food must show a
causal link between that food and the resulting illness." Mann v. D.L. Lee & Sons, Inc., 537 S.E.2d
683,684 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (finding that although plaintiffs probably suffered food poisoning, there
was insufficient evidence that defendant's ham was defective).
Given that no laboratory test performed on the Mann revealed any
pathogen responsible for their symptoms, that the Manns consumed other foods
at the same time they ate the ham, and that the ham itself was not available for
testing but had not looked, smelled, or tasted bad, the Manns could not carry
their burden of excluding every other reasonable hypothesis as to the cause of
their illness.
Id. at 225. See also Meyer v. Super Discount Mkts., 501 S.E.2d 2, 4 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) ("[A] mere
showing that a person became sick subsequent to eating food is insufficient."); Fuggins v. Burger
King, 760 So. 2d 605 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that evidence was insufficient to establish that
defendant's illness was food poisoning and, ifso, whetherithad any connection to the hamburger sold
by defendant).
354. See Kroger Co. v. Beck, 375 N.E.2d 640, 642 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978) (causing a prick in
plaintiffs throat that caused her to vomit).
355. See Bullara, 736 So. 2d at 938.
356. See, e.g., Arbourgh v. SweetBasil Bistro, Inc., 740 So. 2d 186 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (finding
that in food poisoning case, testimony by treating doctors that plaintiff's infection probably was
caused by ingestion of raw chicken at defendant restaurant was sufficient to establish causation).
357. See, e.g., Cooper v. Borden, Inc., 709 So. 2d 878, 881 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (allowing
plaintiff to recover damages for allergic reaction to penicillin in milk after proving all three elements).
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bites off the head of a mouse35 or a cockroach359 hiding in a sandwich, the plaintiff
normally can recover damages for emotional distress.360 Even if nothing is eaten of
the intruder or even of the foodstuff, the plaintiff still may establish causation in
most jurisdictions by proof that he or she was sickened by observing, touching, or
smelling (and thinking about) the mouse, bug, spoilage, or other offending
condition.36 ' As with other types of products, damages for lost consortium are
available on proper proofs.362
358. Plaintiff bought a barbecue sandwich from a vending machine, heated it in a microwave
oven, and took a bite. She heard "an awful crunch," opened the sandwich and discovered a small
mouse with a small tail, but no head. She sued, and the jury awarded damages of $10,000.
GREENVILLE Ns-WS (S.C.), Feb. 24 & 25, 1993.
359. Bullara, 736 So. 2d at 937 (involving a customer who bit into cockroach in a chili dog).
360. See, e.g., Brayman v. 99 West, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 225, 233-34 (D. Mass. 2000) (holding
that theplaintiff, cutin the throatby apiece of glass hidden in mashedpotatoes, could recover forpast
and future pain and suffering, emotional distress, anxiety, mental anguish, embarrassment and loss
of enjoyment of life); Way v. Tampa Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 260 So. 2d 288 (Fla. App. 1972)
(involving a plaintiff who, while sucking the partially frozen contents out of a bottle of Coke,
encountered a "rat with the hair sucked off" and allowing damages for emotional distress).
361. See, e.g., Sowell v. Hyatt Corp., 623 A.2d 1221 (D.C. Ct. App.1993) (finding defendant
liable for a worm in rice that plaintiff almost ate); Chambley v. Apple Rests., Inc., 504 S.E.2d 551
(Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (involving a condom in chicken salad); Prejean v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 457
So. 2d 60 (La. App. 1984) (involving a rotten roast that was "green as grass"); Wallace v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117, 118, 120-21 (Me. 1970) (involving an unpackaged prophylactic
in Coke); see also Cohen v. Allendale Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 291 S.C. 35, 37-38, 351 S.E.2d 897,
898-99 (Ct. App. 1986) (Bell, J.) (finding "psychic nausea" from discovering insect in soft drink).
To recover for emotional distress in most jurisdictions, the plaintiff must establish that the
emotional distress caused or was caused by some injury, illness, or otherphysical condition. See, e.g.,
Ellington v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Tulsa, Inc., 717 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1986) (permitting a plaintiff
to recover for emotional distress from observing a piece of"Good-n-Plenty" candy, which she thought
was a worm, in her bottle of Coke because her distress caused nausea, diarrhea, dehydration, kidney
infection, and fever). Cf. Ford v. Aldi, Inc., 832 S.2d 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (involving a plaintiff,
who, while eating spinach she had prepared, became ill and threw up after discovering a three-quarter
inch insect on her fork). In Missouri, plaintiffs no longer must prove physical harm to recover for
emotional distress, but the distress must be "medically diagnosable" or "medically significant." Id.
at 2. The court held that because plaintiff admitted to having suffered no injury and to having had
insufficient reason to consult a doctor, summary judgment should be affirmed. Id. at 2-3. At least
Maine and Florida have abolished the physical injury requirement for recovery in cases involving
emotional distress caused by the consumption of contaminated food. See Hagan v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 804 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 2001); Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982).
362. See, e.g., Knight v. Just Born, Inc., No. CV-99-606-ST, 2000 WL 924624, at *13 (D. Or.
Mar. 28, 2000) (allowing damages for wife's loss of consortium when husband suffered severe
chemical bums to mouth from eating Hot Tamale candy); Bullara, 736 So. 2d at 936 (noting that for
a few months after she bit into a cockroach in a chili dog, wife was not in the mood for sex and
husband had to cook and eat alone).
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V. CONCLUSION
Manufacturing defects from errors in production are normally quite easy to
understand. Because physical flaws often can be established by the manufacturer's
own design specifications, defects of this type often are also quite easy to prove.
But products involved in accidents sometimes are destroyed in the accident,
discarded thereafter, or otherwise disappear. In such cases, the physical evidence
to prove or disprove that the accident was attributable to a production error may
vanish with the product. Mirroring res ipsa loquitur, the malfunction doctrine,
which in recent years has spread silently across the nation, now provides a safe
harbor for plaintiffs whose injuries probably were caused by manufacturing defects,
the tangible proofs of which have left this world.
Centuries in the past, cases involving the sale of contaminated food and drink
gave birth to early products liability law. The types of foodstuffs consumed today
have multiplied enormously, and modem products liability law still must deal with
the hazards of contaminated food and drink. The defectiveness of food and drink
is now widely ascertained by a consumer's reasonable expectations, and an injured
consumer must trace the injury to such a defect and to the defendant food supplier.
Responsibility for manufacturing defects is the most fundamental obligation of
product manufacturers. The law governing production errors is now quite settled,
and it remains the first pillar of modem products liability law.
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